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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF INHERENT RISK AND CONTROL DESIGN STRENGTH 
ON EXTERNAL AUDITORS' DECISIONS TO RELY ON 
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTIONS 
FEBRUARY, 1989 
MARIO J. MALETTA, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Thomas Kida 
This study uses the audit risk model as a framework 
to identify factors, additional to those described in SAS 
No. 9, that may affect auditors' decisions concerning 
internal audit functions. Specifically, the study 
examines the effect of inherent risk and control design 
strength on auditors' decisions to rely on internal 
audit functions and their decisons to use internal auditors 
as assistants. It also examines the complex interactions 
between inherent risk, control design strength and the 
three variables suggested by SAS No. 9, internal audit 
objectivity, competence, and work performed. The study 
employs a split plot analysis of variance design. Factors 
associated with inherent risk and control design strength 
were manipulated as between subject variables and factors 
associated with the competence, objectivity, and work of 
the internal audit function were manipulated as within 
subject variables. Auditors were randomly assigned to one 
between factor group and were required to make several 
audit planning decisions for a series of cases in which 
v 
factors related to the internal audit function were 
manipulated. Sixty-seven usable responses were obtained 
from managers representing the firm of Peat, Marwick, Main 
& Co. The findings indicate that auditors' decisions to 
rely on internal auditors are quite complex as evidenced 
by the significance of the four way interaction between 
inherent risk, control design strength, objectivity and 
work performed. Comparisons performed to further 
investigate such interactions indicate that in high 
inherent risk situations auditors rely more on internal 
auditors in strong control conditions than in weak control 
conditions. However, in low inherent risk conditions, 
auditors rely similarly on internal auditors regardless of 
the level of control strength. The study also indicates 
that auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as 
assistants are affected by the interaction between 
inherent risk, internal audit objectivity and work 
performed. 
The findings of this study are important given that 
auditing pronouncements addressing auditors' decisions 
concerning internal audit functions do not discuss the role 
of inherent risk and control strength. In addition, the 
results of this study indicate that auditors' decisions 
concerning internal audit functions are more complex than 
has been found in previous research in this area. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's recent discussions 
regarding mandatory management reporting of internal 
controls has led to an increase in the number and average 
size of internal audit departments (Macchiaverna, 1978; 
Norgaard and Granow, 1979; and Wallace, 1984). These 
events, combined with the increase in complexity of the 
audit environment and the pressure on CPA firms to control 
audit fees, have increased the reliance that external 
auditors place on internal audit functions (Rittenburg and 
Davis, 1977; Ward and Robertson, 1980; and Wallace, 1984). 
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Given that pressures on auditors to rely on internal audit 
functions will continue to increase, it is important that 
auditors gain a better understanding of what factors affect 
their internal audit reliance decisions. It is also 
important for client management to know what factors affect 
such decisions so that they can maximize the extent to 
which their internal audit functions can be used to reduce 
audit fees. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 9 (SAS No. 9), 
"The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the Scope of 
the Independent Auditor's Examination", addresses the role 
of the internal audit function in auditors' planning 
decisions (AICPA, 1975) . It states that the auditor may 
rely on the internal audit function in determining the 
2 
extent, nature, and timing of audit procedures. SAS No. 9 
describes the internal audit function as a separate, higher 
level of control in place to determine whether the control 
system is functioning effectively. It instructs the 
independent auditor to examine the internal audit function 
in conjunction with his examination of the system of 
internal accounting control. SAS No. 9 suggests three 
factors that should be considered in this evaluation 
process. These factors are the objectivity, competence, 
and work of the internal auditors. The statement also 
permits auditors to use internal auditors as assistants in 
performing the audit. For example, it notes that the 
internal auditors may assist in substantive or compliance 
testing. In addition, SAS No. 9 states that the auditor 
should consider the competence and objectivity of the 
internal auditors and should "supervise and test their work 
to the extent appropriate under the circumstances." 
Several research studies have been performed concerning 
the integration of internal audit functions into the audit 
process. Among them. Ward (1980), Ward and Robertson 
(1980) , and Wallace (1984) investigated how auditors 
examine and utilize internal auditors in the performance of 
an audit. Gibbs and Schroeder (1979) and Clark, Gibbs and 
Schroeder (1980) examined how auditors evaluate internal 
audit competence, objectivity and work in determining 
reliance on the internal audit function. Brown (1983), 
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Abdel-khalik, Snowball, and Wragge (1983), Schneider 
(1984), Schneider (1985), and Margheim (1986) examined how 
auditors combine and weight the three SAS No. 9 factors in 
making decisions to rely on internal auditors. Consistent 
with SAS No. 9, these studies have shown that auditors 
evaluate internal auditors as part of their evaluations of 
internal control. They also indicate that auditors 
evaluate the three SAS No. 9 factors, competence, 
objectivity and work, in making decisions concerning (1) 
reliance on internal auditors for the purpose of reducing 
the extent of audit testing and (2) the use of internal 
auditors as assistants in performing audit testing. 
An examination of the studies performed in this area 
reveals that they have primarily concentrated on auditors' 
evaluations of the three SAS No. 9 factors. However, given 
that internal audit functions are evaluated in conjunction 
with auditors' examinations of internal control, factors 
that affect the process of integrating internal control 
evaluations into audit planning decisions may also affect 
the extent to which auditors rely on internal auditors. 
The audit risk model (CICA, 1980; AICPA, 1981; and AICPA, 
1983) is a conceptual model which addresses the process of 
integrating internal control evaluations into audit 
planning decisions. 
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The Audit Risk Model 
The most recent version of the audit risk model is 
described in SAS No. 47, "Audit Risk and Materiality in 
Conducting an Audit" (AICPA, 1983). It defines general 
audit risk as the risk that the auditor may unknowingly 
fail to appropriately modify his opinion on financial 
statements that are materially misstated. SAS No. 47 
further describes audit risk as a multiplicative function 
of inherent risk, control risk, and detection risk. 
The audit risk model can be expressed as follows: 
AUDIT = INHERENT X CONTROL X DETECTION 
RISK RISK RISK RISK 
SAS No. 47 defines these risk factors in the following 
manner: 
"Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an account 
balance or class of transactions to error that could be 
material, assuming no related internal accounting 
controls exist." (SAS No. 9, par. 20) 
"Control risk is the risk that error, that could 
be material, will not be prevented or detected by the 
system of internal controls." (SAS No.9, par. 20) 
"Detection risk is defined as the risk that an 
auditor's procedures will lead him to conclude that 
error, that could be material, does not exist when in 
fact such an error does exist." (SAS No. 9, par. 20) 
According to SAS No. 47, the auditor should determine 
an acceptable level of audit risk for the particular audit 
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area under examination (account balance or class of 
transactions). The auditor should then assess the amounts 
of inherent risk and control risk that exist in that audit 
area. Based on the set level of audit risk and the 
perceived levels of inherent and control risk, an 
acceptable level of detection risk should be determined. 
The auditor plans and conducts the audit tests that are 
necessary to achieve the sought after level of detection 
risk. As the auditor's assessment of inherent and control 
risk increases, the level of detection risk that can be 
accepted decreases. This results in the performance of 
more extensive procedures in order to reduce detection risk 
to the level necessary to achieve the tolerable level of 
overall audit risk. Although problems have been noted 
regarding the appropriateness of the audit risk model for 
practical purposes, it has been described as providing the 
basis for gaining a better understanding of reality. 
Therefore, the model is considered to be useful for making 
reasonable and useful predictions and for the purpose of 
planning coherent programs of research (Cushing and 
Loebbecke, 1983; Libby, Artman, and Willingham, 1985). 
Libby et al. (1985) used an expanded version of the 
audit risk model to generate directional hypotheses 
concerning the effect of internal control evaluations on 
audit planning decisions. Due to the multiplicative 
relationship between control risk and inherent risk, they 
5 
hypothesized that the impact of a change in control risk on 
auditors' control reliance decisions should depend on the 
level of inherent risk that exists in the area being 
audited. Based upon SAS No. 43 (AU 320.05), they expanded 
the audit risk model by describing the process of assessing 
control risk in terms of evaluating three components: 
control design strength, test strength, and test results. 
They define control design strength as the strength of a 
prescribed set of internal controls. Test strength is 
defined as the strength of the compliance tests used to 
determine the extent of compliance with the internal 
controls, and test results are defined as the results of 
the compliance tests. Therefore, Libby, et al. expressed 
the audit risk model as follows: 
AUDIT = INHERENT X CONTROL X DETECTION 
RISK RISK RISK RISK 
where, 
CONTROL RISK= f(CONTROL DESIGN STRENGTH, TEST STRENGTH, 
TEST RESULTS) 
Consistent with the audit risk model, Libby et al. found 
that control design strength and test strength interact 
with inherent risk in affecting auditors' planning 
decisions. 
6 
Purpose of the Study 
This study uses the audit risk model as a framework to 
identify factors, additional to those described in SAS No. 
9, that may affect auditors' decisions concerning internal 
audit functions. More specifically, the study examines the 
effect of inherent risk and control design strength on 
auditors' decisions concerning internal audit functions 
and, examines the complex interactions between these 
variables and the three variables suggested by SAS No. 9, 
internal audit objectivity, competence, and work performed. 
The Effect of the Internal Audit Function on Control Risk 
When making decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions, SAS No. 9 instructs the auditor to view the 
internal audit function as a higher level of control and to 
evaluate it in conjunction with the study and evaluation of 
internal control. Therefore, auditors' assessments of 
control risk should not only be affected by the control 
design strength of the area being examined and the tests 
used to determine compliance with those controls, but they 
should also be a function of the quality of the internal 
audit function that exists in the area being audited. 
Thus, control risk should be a function of control design 
strength, the quality of the internal audit function, and 
the test strength and test results of the procedures used 
to examine the control system and the internal audit 
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function. SAS No. 9 also states that when evaluating the 
quality of the internal audit function the objectivity, 
competence, and work of the internal auditors should be 
considered. Therefore, the audit risk model can be 
restated as follows: 
AUDIT RISK = f(INHERENT RISK, CONTROL RISK, DETECTION 
RISK) 
where, 
CONTROL RISK = f(CONTROL DESIGN STRENGTH, QUALITY OF 
THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION, TEST 
STRENGTH AND TEST RESULTS) 
and 
QUALITY OF THE 
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION = f(OBJECTIVITY, COMPETENCE, 
WORK PERFORMED) 
The Effect of Audit Risk Factors on Auditors1 Decisions 
to Rely on Internal Audit Functions 
An examination of this restated model indicates that 
factors, other than those discussed in SAS No. 9, may 
affect the extent to which an auditor will rely on an 
internal audit function to reduce audit testing. According 
to the model and the findings of Libby et al. (1985), 
factors which affect control risk should interact with 
inherent risk in affecting auditors' planning decisions. 
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Given that the internal audit function should affect 
auditors' assessments of control risk, the extent to which 
an internal audit function affects planning decisions 
should be dependent upon the level of inherent risk that 
exists in the area being audited. Also, because the 
internal audit function serves as a control by monitoring 
the designed system of control, the extent to which an 
internal audit function can affect an auditor's assessment 
of control risk is a function of the strength of the 
control system the internal auditors are monitoring. As a 
result, the extent to which auditors rely on internal audit 
functions should not only be dependent upon the 
objectivity, competence, and work performed of the internal 
auditors but, should also be dependent upon the control 
design strength and inherent risk of the area being 
audited. Therefore, the first part of this study examines 
whether inherent risk and control design strength affect 
auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit functions 
and, whether inherent risk and control strength interact 
with the three SAS No. 9 factors in affecting such 
3 
decisons. 
The Effect of Inherent Risk on Auditors' Decisions 
to Use Internal Auditors as Assistants 
As SAS No. 9 states, internal auditors may also be 
used as assistants in the performance of the audit. 
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According to the audit risk model, the use of internal 
auditors in this capacity should have an impact on audit 
risk. Specifically, the use of internal auditors as 
assistants in performing compliance testing may reduce the 
test strength of the compliance procedures resulting in a 
higher level of control risk and thus, a higher level of 
audit risk. Similarly, the use of internal auditors as 
assistants in substantive testing may increase audit risk 
by increasing the level of detection risk associated with 
the substantive procedures. The extent to which a decrease 
in compliance test strength or an increase in detection 
risk will impact overall audit risk should be dependent 
upon the level of inherent risk that exists in the area 
being audited. Therefore, the second part of this study 
will examine the effect of inherent risk on auditors' 
decisions to use internal auditors as assistants. It also 
investigates whether inherent risk interacts with the three 
4 
SAS No. 9 factors in affecting such decisions. 
The Relative Importance of The SAS No. 9_ Factors 
SAS No. 9 provides guidelines on the factors that 
should affect auditors' evaluations and subsequent 
decisions to rely on clients' internal audit functions. 
However, the statement does not provide information 
concerning the relative importance that should be given to 
each of these factors. As a result, several studies have 
10 
examined how auditors combine and weight the three SAS No. 
9 factors (competence, objectivity, and work performed) in 
making decisions to rely on internal audit functions 
(Brown, 1983; Abdel-khalik, Snowball, and Wragge, 1983; 
Schneider, 1984 and 1985; Margheim, 1986.) If factors 
associated with inherent risk and control design strength 
influence auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions, it is also possible that these variables may 
affect the way auditors weight the three SAS No. 9 factors. 
Therefore, the final part of this study examines the effect 
of inherent risk and control design strength on the way in 
which auditors combine and weight the three SAS No. 9 
factors in making decisions concerning internal audit 
functions. 
Overview 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Chapter II discusses the literature related to internal 
audit functions and the audit risk model. Chapter III 
describes the specific hypotheses examined in the study and 
the methodology used to test those hypotheses. Chapter IV 
presents a statistical analysis of the data and a 
discussion of the results. Chapter V discusses the 
conclusions, limitations, and directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The nature of this study requires that two major areas 
of literature be reviewed. Part I of this section 
addresses the literature concerning the evaluation and use 
of internal auditors by external auditors. Part II 
addresses the literature concerning audit risk. 
Part I: The Evaluation and Use of Internal Auditors 
This section of the literature review is divided into 
four subsections. The first subsection reviews SAS No. 9: 
The Effect of an Internal Audit Function on the Independent 
Auditor's Examination. The second disusses the studies 
which have examined whether or not auditors rely on 
internal auditors in the performance of an audit. The 
third subsection discusses those studies which have 
examined how auditors evaluate the three SAS No. 9 factors, 
competence, objectivity and work performed. Finally, the 
last subsection addresses the literature concerning how 
auditors combine and weight the three SAS No. 9 factors. 
Statement On Auditing Standards No. 9_ 
SAS No. 9: The Effect of an Internal Audit Function 
on the Scope of the Independent Auditor's Examination was 
issued in December, 1975. It states that "the independent 
auditor should consider the procedures, if any, performed 
12 
by internal auditors in determining the nature, timing, and 
extent of his own auditing procedures." SAS No. 9 refers 
to internal auditors as being a separate, higher level of 
control in place to determine whether the control system is 
functioning effectively. It also instructs the independent 
auditor to examine the internal audit function in concert 
with his examination of the system of internal accounting 
control. Further, SAS No. 9 instructs the auditor to 
evaluate and utilize the work of the internal auditors in 
the planning of audit work. 
When considering the competence of the internal 
auditors, SAS No. 9 states that the auditor should 
"...inquire about the qualifications of the internal audit 
staff, including consideration of the client's practices 
for hiring, training and supervising the internal audit 
staff." When considering the objectivity of the internal 
auditors SAS No. 9 states that the auditor should 
"...consider the organizational level to which internal 
auditors report the results of their work and the 
organizational level to which they report 
administratively." Lastly, in considering the work 
performed of the internal auditors SAS No. 9 states that 
the auditor should "...examine documentary evidence of the 
work performed by the internal auditors and should consider 
such factors as whether the scope of the work is 
appropriate." 
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Finally, SAS No. 9 permits auditors to use internal 
auditors to provide direct assistance in performing the 
audit. SAS No. 9 states: 
"The independent auditor may make use of internal 
auditors to provide direct assistance in performing an 
examination in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. Internal auditors may assist in performing 
substantive tests or tests of compliance. When the 
independent auditor makes such use of internal auditor, he 
should consider their competence and objectivity and 
supervise and test their work to the extent appropriate in 
the circumstances." 
In summary, SAS No. 9 directs the independent auditor 
to (1) evaluate the internal audit function as an element 
of control, (2) consider the work of the internal audit 
function in determining the extent and nature of audit 
procedures and to (3) use the internal auditors as 
assistants in performing the audit examination. 
The Use of Internal Audit Functions by Auditors 
Several studies have examined how auditors utilize 
internal auditors in the performance of an audit. Ward and 
Robertson (1980) surveyed 42 independent auditors and 47 
internal auditors to investigate this issue. Specifically, 
they attempted to (1) determine the extent to which 
independent auditors rely on internal audit functions, (2) 
determine whether both groups believe such reliance is 
sufficient and (3) elicit predictions on how auditors' 
reliance on the internal audit function may change in the 
14 
future. Their survey revealed that virtually all auditors 
rely on internal auditors to some extent in the performance 
of an audit. In addition, 50% of the auditors and 47% of 
the internal auditors felt that internal audit functions 
were not relied upon to the fullest extent possible. 
Finally, many auditors predicted that internal auditors 
would be relied upon to a much greater extent in the 
future. 
In 1984, Wallace performed a time series study to 
examine the impact of internal audit activities on external 
audit fees and activities over time. Wallace gathered data 
from cooperating companies for the period 1975 to 1981 and 
analyzed it using both regression analysis and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Wallace found that, on average, only 5% 
of the total man-hours available for an audit are allocated 
to the internal audit function. Further, Wallace found 
that such assistance generally results in a 10% reduction 
in external audit fees. Wallace also found that from 1975 
to 1981 there had been an increase in the extent to which 
auditors utilize internal auditors in the documentation of 
internal controls and in the performance of compliance and 
substantive testing. Finally, Wallace concluded that over 
the time period analyzed, there was an increase in the 
extent to which auditors rely on internal auditors and an 
increase in the extent to which auditors modify their audit 
programs as a result of internal audit activities. 
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Consistent with SAS No. 9, these studies indicate that 
auditors do rely on internal audit functions in performing 
audit examinations and that auditors evaluate internal 
audit functions in conjunction with their evaluations of 
internal control. These studies also provide evidence 
indicating that the extent to which internal auditors are 
being relied upon by external auditors has been increasing 
and may continue to increase in the future. 
Auditors1 Evaluations of Internal Audit Competence, 
Objectivity, and Work 
Two major studies have been performed which have 
examined how auditors evaluate internal audit competence, 
objectivity and work in determining reliance on the 
internal audit function. The first of these studies was 
performed in 1979 by Gibbs and Schroeder. They performed a 
series of surveys and experiments in an attempt to compile 
a list of criteria that auditors use to evaluate the three 
SAS No. 9 factors. They began by developing an exhaustive 
list of attributes which could be used by auditors in 
forming overall judgments about internal audit reliance. 
This list was compiled by asking 148 CPA's and 111 internal 
auditors to detail the criteria they use to evaluate 
internal audit departments. The list of responses was 
categorized and ranked based on frequency with which each 
item was mentioned. Experts were then asked to rank these 
items based upon the extent to which they believed each 
item was important in evaluating internal audit departments 
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for reliance purposes. In order to test these ranked items 
in an experimental setting, Gibbs and Schroeder manipulated 
them in case studies which were administered to a third 
group of auditors. The final output was three ranked lists 
of criteria that were indicative of the measures currently- 
used by auditors to evaluate internal audit competence, 
objectivity, and work performed, respectively. Using 
ANOVA, they found that two variables, the internal audit 
staffs' knowledge of company operations and the quantity 
and quality of the supervision over the internal audit 
staff accounted for most of the explained variance related 
toitors' assessments of internal audit competence. The 
independence of the internal audit function and the level 
to which the internal audit department reports were found 
to be the two most important factors employed in evaluating 
internal audit objectivity. Finally, in evaluating the 
work performed by the internal audit department, 
management's readiness to act on the recommendations of the 
internal audit function and management's support of the 
internal auditors were the two factors found to explain the 
most variance. 
Later in 1979, Clark, Gibbs and Schroeder extended the 
research of Gibbs and Schroeder (1979) by using case 
studies to examine auditors' judgments of internal audit 
objectivity. Case studies were developed by manipulating 
the five objectivity factors found to be the most important 
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in the Gibbs and Schroeder study. The five factors which 
were manipulated are as follows: 
1. The independence of the internal audit department. 
2. The level at which the internal audit staff reports. 
3. The ability of the internal audit department to 
investigate any area of company activity. 
4. Top management's support of the work of the internal 
auditing department. 
5. Adequate scope of internal audit department audits. 
These cases were administered to 25 partners and managers 
of international CPA firms who were asked to judge the 
objectivity of the internal audit department described in 
each case. Using ANOVA, Clark et al. found that of the 
factors manipulated, the independence of the internal audit 
department accounted for most of the explained variance in 
auditors' assessments of internal auditor objectivity. The 
level at which the internal audit staff reports and the 
ability of the internal audit department to investigate any 
area of company activity were found to explain the second 
and third most variance, respectively. 
How Auditors Weight the Three SAS No. 9_ Factors 
The most recent studies concerning internal auditors 
have examined how auditors combine and weight the three SAS 
No. 9 factors in making decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions. Brown (1983) performed the first study 
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addressing this question. He provided auditors with a 
brief description of a manufacturing company including 
information on the company's internal audit function. 
Specifically, each auditor received 48 descriptions of 
internal audit functions. They consisted of 32 principle 
cases and 16 repeat cases. The characteristics of the 
internal audit function were presented in a question format 
with each pre-answered as either "yes' or "no." The six 
questions were selected based on discussions with actual 
auditors. Two questions were used to represent internal 
audit competence, one was used to represent objectivity and 
three questions were used to represent the quality of the 
internal auditors' work. The questions addressing internal 
audit competence related to whether or not (1) internal 
auditors are trained in company operations, procedures, and 
policies, and (2) emphasis is placed upon professional 
certificates in hiring new internal auditors (i.e. CPA, 
CMA, etc.). The question addressing internal audit 
objectivity related to whether or not the internal audit 
function reports to an organizational level which assures 
independence of operations. Finally, the questions 
addressing the quality of work performed by the internal 
audit function related to whether (1) the work of the 
internal audit function was satisfactory during previous 
audits, (2) the internal auditors performed satisfactory 
follow-up procedures on detected deficiencies, and (3) the 
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staff is closely supervised and their work reviewed. 
Subjects were asked to detemine the overall degree of 
reliance they would place on the internal audit function 
using a scale which ranged from 1 (totally unreliable) to 7 
(strongly reliable). Brown obtained responses from 101 
auditors with 4 different levels of experience from several 
"Big Eight" accounting firms. Using ANOVA, he found that 
the variables relating to objectivity and work accounted 
for 35% and 25% of the explained variance, respectively. 
Competence was found to account for only 9% of the 
explained variance and no significant interactions between 
the factors were found. In addition, no differences were 
found between the "Big Eight" firms employed in the study. 
Finally, linear additive models of auditor judgments were 
found to explain a large proportion of the judgment 
variance. 
Abdel-khalik et al. (1983) investigated the effect of 
three specific EDP audit techniques and two organizational 
variables associated with internal auditor objectivity on 
auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as assistants 
as well as on their budgeting decisions. The three EDP 
audit techniques were the integrated test facility, the 
test deck, and the use of generalized audit software. The 
two organizational variables addressed the level to which 
the internal auditing department reports and the internal 
auditor's level of responsibility in reviewing changes in 
application programs. External auditors were asked to 
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determine (1) the extent to which they would utilize the 
internal audit staff as assistants, (2) the total man hours 
planned for compliance testing and (3) the total man hours 
planned for substantive testing. No competence variables 
were included in the study. 
The variables associated with the three EDP audit 
techniques were manipulated by indicating which of the 
three EDP audit techniques was being used by the internal 
audit function in their audit activities. The variable 
addressing the organizational level to which the internal 
audit function reports was manipulated by describing the 
internal audit department as either reporting to the 
company controller or an independent audit committee. The 
second organizational variable was manipulated by 
describing the internal audit function as either reviewing 
changes to application programs or not reviewing such 
changes. All five independent variables were manipulated 
within two experimental settings. 
The subjects in the study were managers and seniors 
from three large public accounting firms. All subjects had 
experience in auditing computerized information systems. 
Each subject was provided with (1) a set of instructions 
describing the task, etc., (2) a flowchart of the system 
and (3) descriptions of the internal audit function. Each 
subject made decisions for 32 cases, representing all 
possible combinations of the five factors used in the 
study. 
21 
ANOVA was used to evaluate the effect of the factors on 
auditors' judgments. Across all judgments, the results can 
be summarized as follows: (1) The level to which the 
internal audit function reports accounted for largest 
percentage of explained variance (2) All three EDP audit 
techniques were found to be of equal importance in that no 
one technique was found to explain a significantly greater 
percentage of variance than another. (3) A high degree of 
within subject consistency was found, however, between 
subject consistency was low with the exception of the 
results discussed in (1). 
Schneider (1984) examined auditors' evaluations of 
internal audit functions using a multidimensional scaling 
technique. First, Schneider performed an experiment to 
identify operational definitions for each of the SAS No. 9 
factors. Three sets of five characteristics, each at two 
levels, were used to construct three full factorial sets of 
internal audit profiles. Each characteristic was chosen 
based on the results of previous studies concerning SAS No. 
9. Subjects were asked to rate one set of profiles using a 
10 point scale. Schneider found the following 
characteristics to account for the most variance in auditor 
judgment: 
Competence: 1. The level of instruction and 
supervision by senior internal audit 
personnel. 
2. The level of internal audit 
experience. 
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Objectivity: 1. The extent of top management support 
of the internal audit department. 
2. The organizational level to which the 
internal audit department reports. 
3. The extent to which the internal audit 
department is free from conflicting 
duties. 
Work: 1. The scope of internal audits 
2. The quantity and quality of internal 
audit documentation. 
A second experiment was conducted to determine four 
"realistic and materially different" levels for each of the 
variables. Each subject received a set of cases which were 
formed using one characteristic from each factor group. 
Eight levels were used for each characteristic. The 
subjects were asked to rank the strength of the cases using 
a ten point scale. Four levels were selected for each of 
the 6 variables using multidimensional scaling. 
Finally, Schneider used the operational definitions 
obtained from experiments I and II to create 64 internal 
audit profiles. Subjects were asked to rank these profiles 
on a 100 point ordinal scale of strength. The results were 
as follows: (1) the variables related to internal audit 
work accounted for 42% of the explained variance while 
variables associated with competence and objectivity 
accounted for 35% and 23% of the explained variance, 
respectively, (2) additive functions were found to provide 
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a good fit for most of the subjects' data, and (3) a high 
degree of concensus was found among auditors with respect 
to their internal audit evaluations. 
Schneider (1985) furthered his research in this area by 
examining the relationship between auditors' evaluations of 
internal audit strength and their decisions to rely on the 
internal audit function in audit planning. Auditors were 
given case profiles containing general information 
regarding the three SAS No.9 factors and were asked to rank 
the profiles in order of strength. Auditors were also 
given information about the revenue cycle of a hypothetical 
company and asked to indicate the extent to which they 
would reduce the number of audit hours related to this 
cycle for each internal audit profile. With respect to 
judgments on internal audit strength, Schneider found the 
following: (1) An additive model was found to provide a 
good fit for most auditors' judgments. (2) On average, 
work performed was found to be the most important factor 
followed closely by competence. Objectivity was found to 
be the least important of the three factors. 
With respect to auditors' reliance judgments, the 
following results were found: (1) auditors were found to 
reduce their audit work on the revenue cycle by an average 
of 38% as result of relying on internal auditors and (2) 
the relative weights placed on each of the three SAS No. 9 
factors were approximately the same as they were for the 
strength judgments. Only a moderate level of inter-auditor 
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concensus was found. The results also showed that as the 
strength of the internal audit profiles increased, response 
variability was also found to increase. 
In 1986, Margheim used a between-subjects design to 
determine whether auditors actually adjust the extent and 
nature of their audit work as a result of reliance placed 
on internal auditors. In addition, she investigated 
whether factors associated with objectivity, competence, 
and work performed affect this adjustment process. 
Margheim provided auditors with cases that described the 
evaluation of an accounts receivable internal control 
system. Auditors were given (1) background information on 
the company and its accounts receivable, (2) the findings 
and recommendations of the internal auditors, and (3) 
descriptions of the internal auditors. Within the internal 
audit descriptions, competence and work performed were 
combined and manipulated as one variable while objectivity 
was manipulated as a second variable. The auditors were 
asked to complete an audit plan related to the receivables 
area. The plan required that they budget hours for 
compliance and substantive tests. Margheim found that the 
competence/work performance variable significantly impacted 
auditors' planning decisions. However, it was found that 
the objectivity variable did not significantly impact 
auditors' decisions. No significant interactions were 
found between the two variables. These results were found 
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for total audit hours, hours of compliance testing, and 
hours of substantive testing. 
Summary of Part I 
In summary, the literature addressing internal 
auditors has shown that auditors evaluate internal auditors 
as part of their evaluations of internal control and that 
auditors do rely on internal auditors in performing audit 
examinations. The literature also indicates that auditors' 
reliance on internal auditors comes (1) in the form of 
reductions in the extent of audit testing and (2) in the 
use of internal auditors as assistants. The literature 
also shows that studies concerning auditors' decisions to 
rely on internal auditors have primarily concentrated on 
the three factors suggested by SAS No. 9, competence, 
objectivity and work performed. 
Since internal audit functions are evaluated as part 
of the auditors' study of internal control, factors 
affecting the process of integrating internal control 
evaluations into audit planning decisions may also affect 
auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit functions. 
This integration process and the factors that affect it are 
addressed by the audit risk model. 
Part II: The Audit Risk Model 
This part of the literature review addresses the 
history of the audit risk model. The landmark paper in 
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audit risk area was written in 1972 by Elliott and Rogers. 
The paper discusses the differences between the terms alpha 
risk and beta risk as they pertain to performing an audit 
examination. Alpha risk is defined as the risk of 
rejecting correct financial statements while beta risk is 
defined as the risk of accepting financial statements that 
contain a material error. Elliott and Rogers argue that 
auditors should be most concerned with beta risk because of 
the potentially high costs associated with errors of this 
type. They elaborate on this point by describing a 
judgmental procedure for determining the level of beta risk 
to be used in planning substantive tests. The procedure 
involves assessing the quality of internal control and the 
quality of the evidence obtained in other audit procedures. 
This was the first model that addressed a procedure to 
quantitatively measure audit risk. 
Later in 1972, the AICPA published "Statement on 
Auditing Procedure 54: The Auditor's Study and Evaluation 
of Internal Control" (later incorporated as Section 320 of 
the Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards). 
This statement discusses a more involved process for 
measuring audit risk. Specifically, it suggests that the 
reliability level of substantive tests be set in such a 
manner that when it is combined with the auditor's reliance 
on internal accounting control and other relevant audit 
factors, a combined reliability level sufficient to satisfy 
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the auditor's overall objectives for the audit is achieved. 
The following formula is provided as a means of applying 
this concept: 
(1 - R) 
(1 - C) 
where 
S = reliability level of substantive tests, 
R = combined reliability level desired, 
C = reliance assigned to interal accounting control and 
other relevant factors. 
In theory, an auditor could use this formula to 
determine the level of reliability necessary for 
substantive testing. In 1975, Stringer proposed an 
extension of this model based on a concept discussed in 
AICPA Statement 54. Statement 54 states that "the 
auditor's reliance on substantive tests may be derived from 
tests of details, from analytical review procedures, or 
from any combination of both that he considers appropriate 
in the circumstances." Stringer proposed that the 
reliability level desired for substantive tests be 
apportioned between the reliance assigned to tests of 
details, "D", and the reliance assigned to analytical 
review procedures, "A", using the following formula: 
S = 1 - (1 - D) (1 - A) 
Anderson (1977) further suggested that factors related 
to "inherent risk" somehow be incorporated into the risk 
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model. Citing Statement 54 (then SAS Section 320, Appendix 
B), Anderson defines inherent risk as "the risk of 
occurrence of material errors in financial statements in 
the absence of satisfactorinternal accounting control." 
Anderson claims that the risk of undetected misstatements 
remaining in the audited financial statements is the 
product of three factors: 
1. inherent risk (the risk of an error occurring in the 
first place), 
2. control risk (the risk of the control system failing to 
prevent or detect such error, which is the complement of 
the relative strength of internal controls) , 
3. audit risk (the risk of the audit procedures failing to 
detect such errors) . 
In 1979, Warren formally incorporated the concept of 
inherent risk into the AICPA model by including a component 
which requires the auditor to make a subjective evluation 
of the likelihood of material error. This new component is 
labled "ME" and is included in the model in the following 
fashion: 
(1 - R) = (1 - S) (1 - C) (ME) , 
where 
S = reliability level of substantive tests, 
R = combined reliability level desired, 
C = reliance assigned to interal accounting control and 
other relevant factors. 
and 
ME = the likelihood of material error as assessed by the 
auditor. 
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In 1980, the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants issued a research monograph introducing a model 
which incorporates the inherent risk of a material error 
and the risk associated with analytical review procedures 
into the audit risk model. The model expresses "joint 
risk" to be the product of four risk factors: 
Joint risk = inherent risk x control risk 
x risk from other audit procedures 
x substantive test risk 
In 1981, the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA 
issued SAS 39: Audit Sampling, to supersede Sections 320A 
and 320B of SAS. This statement modifies the original risk 
model presented in the Statement 54 by incorporating a 
factor for analytical review procedures and other relevant 
substantive tests. This factor is similiar to that 
discussed by Stringer (1975). The statement also modifies 
the terms used in the model to reflect risk factors instead 
of reliance factors. The revised model is as follows: 
UR = IC X AR X TD 
UR = the allowable ultimate risk that the auditor 
will fail to detect a monetary error equal to the 
maximum tolerable amount, 
IC = the auditor's assessment of the risk that, given 
that errors equal to tolerable error occur, the 
system of internal accounting control fails to 
detect them. 
AR = the auditor's assessment of the risk that 
analytical review procedures and other relevant 
substantive tests would fail to detect errors 
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equal to tolerable error, and 
TD = the sampling risk of incorrect acceptance for 
substantive tests of details (AICPA, 1981, 
Appendix, pararaph 4). 
The term tolerable error is defined as the amount of 
monetary error that could exist in a particular account 
balance or class of transactions without causing the 
financial statements to be materially misstated. 
SAS 39 carefully explains that the model expresses the 
general relationship of the risks associated with the 
auditor's evaluation of internal accounting controls, 
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substantive tests of details, and analytical review 
procedures and other relevant substantive tests. It also 
states that, "the model is not intended to be a 
mathematical formula including all factors that may 
influence the determination of individual risk components; 
however, some auditors may find such a model to be useful 
when planning appropriate risk levels for audit procedures 
to achieve the auditor's desired audit risk." To use the 
model in planning audit procedures, the statement suggests 
that first, an acceptable level of audit risk (UR) be 
selected followed by a subjective quantification of the 
levels of IC and AR. These elements should then be plugged 
into the model in order to determine TD, the allowable risk 
of acceptance for the substantive test of details. 
The most recent version of the audit risk model is 
contained in SAS 47: Audit Risk and Materiality in 
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Conducting an Audit. This version of the model is a 
modification of the model expressed in SAS No. 39. It 
differs with the model expressed in SAS No. 39 in that the 
model in SAS No. 47 combines AR, analytical review risk, 
and TD, the risk associated with tests of details, into one 
element called detection risk. Also, the "IC" or "internal 
control" component discussed in the SAS No. 39 model is 
defined in more detail in SAS No. 47 and renamed "control 
risk". The model can be expressed as follows: 
Audit Risk = Inherent Risk x Control Risk x Detection 
Risk 
or AR = IR x CR x DR 
where 
AR = the risk that an auditor may unknowingly fail to 
appropriately modify his opinion on financial 
statements that are materially misstated. 
IR = is the susceptibility of an account balance or 
class of transactions to error that could be 
material when aggregated with error in other 
balances or classes, assuming that no related 
internal accounting controls exist. 
CR = is the risk that error that could occur in an 
account balance or class of transactions and that 
could be material, when aggregated with error in 
other balances or classes, will not be 
prevented or detected on a timely basis by the 
system of internal accounting control. 
DR = is the risk that an auditor's procedures will 
lead him to conclude that error in an account 
balance or class of transactions that could be 
material, when aggregated with error in other 
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balances or classes, does not exist when in fact 
such error does exist. 
SAS No. 47 also states that inherent risk and control 
risk differ from detection risk in that they exist 
independently of the audit of financial statements, whereas 
detection risk relates to the auditor's procedures and can 
be changed at his discretion. Further, detection risk 
should bear an inverse relationship to inherent and control 
risk. The lower the level of inherent and control risk 
that the auditor believes exists, the greater the level of 
dectection risk the auditor can accept. In applying the 
audit risk model the auditor should determine an acceptable 
level of audit risk for the particular audit area under 
examination (account balance or class of transactions). 
The auditor should then assess the amounts of inherent risk 
and control risk that exist in that audit area. Based on 
the set level of audit risk and the perceived levels of 
inherent and control risk, an acceptable level of detection 
risk should be determined. 
In 1983, Cushing and Loebbecke surveyed and analyzed 
the body of auditing literature addressing the measurement 
and control of audit risk. They critically examine the 
representative audit risk model claiming that the 
applicability of the model in practice is limited. They 
state that models such as the audit risk model are 
"abstractions from reality" and claim that they can rarely, 
if ever, acurately incorporate all aspects of reality. 
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They further state that the use of such simplifications in 
practice can "cause the user to misunderstand the reality 
being represented" which can lead to "unreliable 
predictions." However, Cushing and Loebbecke1s criticisms 
only apply to the application of the audit risk model in 
practice. With respect to the use of the audit risk model 
as a research tool they state that the audit risk model can 
be used to gain a better understanding of reality and to 
make reasonable and useful predictions. 
Libby, Artman, and Willingham (1985) used the audit 
risk model to develop hypotheses concerning the the effects 
of internal control evaluations on audit planning 
decisions. They state that the audit risk model "eases the 
process of interpreting results, evaluating implications 
for practice, and planning a coherent program of research." 
Libby et al. manipulated variables associated with control 
risk in settings with different levels of inherent risk. 
Consistent with the audit risk model, they found that 
control risk and inherent risk interact in affecting 
auditors' planning decisions. Specifically, Libby et al. 
used the current professional standards relating to the 
evaluation of internal control to further define the 
control risk component of the audit risk model. Section 
320.50 of the current professional standards defines the 
process of evaluating a system of internal control as 
consisting of two steps. The first step involves a review 
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of the system, after which the auditor should be able to 
make a preliminary evaluation of the system, and the second 
step involves an assessment of compliance with the 
prescribed controls. Libby et al. use the term "control 
design strength" to represent the strength of the system as 
determined in step one of this evaluation process. They 
define the process of determining compliance with the 
control system using two terms. The term "test strength" 
represents the strength of the tests used to determine 
compliance with the controls, and the term "test results" 
is used to represent the results of the compliance tests. 
Thus, the process of determining control risk is a function 
of control design strength, test strength, and test 
results. Based on the inverse relationship between 
control risk and inherent risk, expressed by the audit risk 
model, Libby et al. hypothesized that changes in control 
design strength and test strength would have a greater 
impact on auditors' planning decision in situations of high 
inherent risk than in situations of low inherent risk. The 
experiment required each participating auditor to provide 
control reliance ratings for a series of audit cases where 
attributes relating to inherent risk, control design 
strength, and test strength were manipulated. The cases 
included information concerning a company and a description 
of the company's purchasing-disbursements cycle. The 
experimental variables were manipulated within this 
information. Analysis of variance was used to analyze the 
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results. They found that the auditors responses closely 
matched the predictions developed from the audit risk 
model. The results suggest that auditors act as if they 
consider the contingent nature of the effects of inherent 
risk and control risk (defined as control design strength 
and test strength) when making audit planning decisions. 
These results are in contrast to the simplistic decision 
rules discovered in much of the psychological literature. 
Summary of the Literature Review 
Because evidence indicates that internal audit 
functions are evaluated as part of the auditor's study and 
evaluation of internal control, and because factors 
associated with inherent risk and control risk have been 
found to affect the process of integrating internal control 
evaluations into audit planning decisions, such factors may 
affect the extent to which the existence of an internal 
audit function influences auditors' planning decisions. 
More specifically, an internal audit function serves as a 
control by monitoring the extent of compliance with a 
prescribed system of internal control. Thus, an auditor's 
assessment of control risk should be affected by the 
existence of an internal audit function. According to the 
most recent version of the audit risk model, the extent to 
which a change in control risk affects an auditor's 
determination of an acceptable level of detection risk is 
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dependent upon the inherent risk of the area being audited. 
Therefore, the extent to which the existence of an internal 
audit function affects auditors' control reliance decisions 
should be dependent upon the level of inherent risk that 
exists in the area being audited. In addition, because the 
internal audit function serves as a control by monitoring 
the designed system of control, the extent to which the 
existence of an internal audit function affects auditors' 
control reliance decisions should also be dependent upon 
the strength of the control system being monitored. 
Therefore, this study will examine the role of inherent 
risk and control design strength on auditors' decisions to 
rely on internal audit functions. It will also investigate 
whether or not inherent risk and control design strength 
interact with the three factors suggested by SAS No. 9 in 
affecting auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. 
The audit risk model also indicates that the use of 
internal auditors as assistants may affect audit risk by 
decreasing the test strength of compliance tests and by 
increasing the detection risk associated with substantive 
or detailed tests. The extent to which audit risk is 
affected by the use of internal auditors in performing 
either compliance or substantive testing should be 
dependent upon the level of inherent risk that exists in 
the area being audited. Therefore, this study will also 
investigate the affect of inherent risk on auditors' 
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decisions to utilize internal auditors as assistants. It 
will also investigate whether or not inherent risk 
interacts with the three SAS No. 9 factors in affecting 
such decisions. 
Finally, given that inherent risk and/or control 
design strength may affect auditors' decisions concerning 
internal audit functions, this study will also examine the 
effect of these variables on the way in which auditors 
combine and weight the three SAS No. 9 factors, 
competence, objectivity, and work performed, in making 
internal audit decisions. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
PART I; Hypotheses 
Auditors' Decisions to Rely On Internal Audit Functions 
The Effect of Inherent Risk. The first set of hypotheses 
address whether factors associated with inherent risk 
affect auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions, and whether inherent risk interacts with the 
three internal audit quality factors suggested by SAS No. 9 
(objectivity, competence, and work performed) in affecting 
auditors' reliance decisions. 
The hypotheses that will be tested are as follows: 
HI: The extent to which auditors rely on internal 
audit functions will depend upon the inherent risk of the 
area examined. 
H2a: The extent to which internal audit objectivity 
affects auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions will depend upon the inherent risk of the area 
examined. 
H2b: The extent to which internal audit competence 
affects auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions will depend upon the inherent risk of the area 
examined. 
H2c: The extent to which the work performed by the 
internal audit function affects auditors' decisions to rely 
on internal audit functions will depend upon the inherent 
risk of the area examined. 
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The reason that the exact nature of the relationship 
between inherent risk and auditors' decisions concerning 
internal audit functions has not been expressed within 
these hypotheses is because more than one possibility 
exists. Recall that the internal audit function is 
considered an element of the system of internal control and 
thus should affect auditors' assessments of control risk. 
Also, recall that the audit risk model suggests that a 
multiplicative relationship exists between inherent risk 
and control risk. Therefore, the audit risk model implies 
that a multiplicative relationship exists between factors 
associated with the quality of the internal audit function 
and factors associated with inherent risk. This suggests 
that the effect of the three SAS No. 9 factors on auditors' 
decisions to rely on internal audit functions may be 
greater in high risk situations than in low risk 
situations. In other words, auditors may feel that the 
quality of the internal audit function is more important 
when the area being audited has a higher level of inherent 
risk. For example, the difference between a high and a low 
level of internal audit objectivity may have a greater 
effect on auditors' reliance decisions in areas of high 
inherent risk than in areas of low inherent risk. 
This relationship can be illustrated using a numerical 
example. Assume there are two scenarios, A and B. In 
scenario A, a company has a highly objective internal audit 
function, and therefore, the assessed level of control risk 
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in a particular audit area is .2. In scenario B, assume 
that the same company has a less objective internal audit 
function, and therefore, the assessed level of control risk 
is .4 for the same audit area. The difference in the 
assessed level of control risk related to the difference in 
the objectivity of the internal audit function is .2. If 
this audit area has an inherent risk level of .6, then the 
impact of the difference in control risk on the total level 
of audit risk would be .12 or (.2 x .6). However, if the 
audit area has an inherent risk level of .2, the difference 
in the total level of audit risk would be .04 or (.2 x .2). 
In the low inherent risk case, the difference in audit risk 
is small (.04). Thus, the difference in the level of 
control reliance selected in each of the two scenarios 
should be small. However, in the high inherent risk case, 
the difference in audit risk is much larger (.12). Thus, 
the difference in the level of control reliance selected 
for the two scenarios should be quite large. Consequently, 
the effect of internal audit objectivity on the extent to 
which an auditor will rely on an internal audit function, 
according to the multiplicative relationships described in 
the audit risk model, will be greater in situations where 
the level of inherent risk is high than in situations where 
the inherent risk is low. 
However, it is also possible that the multiplicative 
relationship suggested by the audit risk model may not hold 
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true. Auditors may be reluctant to rely on internal audit 
functions in situations of high inherent risk, regardless 
of the quality of the internal audit function. This 
suggests that the effect of internal audit objectivity, 
competence, and work performed on auditors' decisions to 
rely on internal audit functions would be greater in low 
inherent risk situations than in high inherent risk 
situations. In other words, factors related to the quality 
of the internal audit function may be less important in 
high inherent risk situations because auditors may restrict 
the extent to which they will rely on internal audit 
functions in such situations. 
Given the difficulty in determining the exact nature 
of the relationship between inherent risk and auditors' 
internal audit reliance decisions, hypotheses 1 through 2c 
will be tested to determine if there is a relationship 
between these variables. Subsequent to testing these 
hypotheses, this study will examine the nature of the 
relationship between inherent risk and auditors' decisions 
to rely on internal audit functions. 
The Effect of Control Design Strength. The second set of 
hypotheses examine whether factors associated with control 
design strength affect auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal audit functions, and whether control design 
strength interacts with the three factors suggested by SAS 
No. 9 (objectivity, competence, and work performed) in 
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affecting auditors' reliance decisions. Control design 
strength, as previously discussed, refers to the strength 
of the prescribed set of internal controls which exist in a 
given audit area. Because the internal audit function 
serves as a control by monitoring this prescribed set of 
internal controls, the extent to which the internal audit 
function affects auditors' reliance decisions may depend 
upon the strength of the internal controls being monitored. 
For example, in an area where the system of internal 
control is relatively weak, the extent to which an internal 
audit function can be relied upon may be limited. However, 
in a situation where the system of internal control is 
strong, the internal audit function may be relied upon to a 
greater degree. In effect, assuring compliance with a 
strong set of internal controls may be better than assuring 
compliance with a weak set of internal controls. 
The effect of the three SAS No. 9 factors on auditors' 
reliance decisions may also depend on the control design 
strength of the system being audited. For example, 
internal auditors' use of comprehensive audit procedures in 
monitoring weak internal controls may not affect auditors' 
reliance decisions as greatly as the use of such technigues 
in monitoring areas with strong internal controls. 
Similarly, the impact of internal audit competence and 
objectivity on auditors' reliance decisions may also be 
affected by control design strength. The effect of high 
levels of internal audit competence and objectivity on 
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auditors' reliance decisions may be minimal in settings 
where the internal controls are weak. 
Therefore, several hypotheses will be examined 
concerning the impact of control design strength on 
auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. The first 
addresses the effect of control design strength on 
auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit functions. 
H3: The extent to which auditors rely on internal 
audit functions will be greater in situations where 
internal controls are strong, than in situations where 
internal controls are weak. 
The remaining hypotheses address the interactions 
between control design strength and the three internal 
audit quality variables discussed in SAS No. 9. They are 
as follows: 
H4a: The effect of the work performed by the internal 
audit function on the extent to which auditors rely on 
internal audit functions will be greater in situations 
where internal controls are strong, than in situations 
where internal controls are weak. 
H4b: The effect of internal audit competence on the 
extent to which auditors rely on internal audit functions 
will be greater in situations where internal controls are 
strong, than in situations where internal controls are 
weak. 
H4c: The effect of internal audit objectivity on the 
extent to which auditors rely on internal audit functions 
will be greater in situations where internal controls are 
strong, than in situations where internal controls are 
weak. 
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The Interaction Between Control Design Strength and 
Inherent Risk. Consistent with the audit risk model, Libby 
et al. (1985) found that control design strength and 
inherent risk interact to affect auditors' control reliance 
decisions. In other words, they found that the effect of 
control design strength on auditors' control reliance 
decisions was dependent upon the level of inherent risk. 
Given that control design strength may affect auditors' 
internal audit reliance decisons, it is possible that the 
extent to which it affects such decisions is dependent upon 
the level of inherent risk that exists in the area being 
examined. For example, in a low inherent risk situation, 
auditors may rely on an internal audit function that 
monitors a weak set of controls. However, in a high 
inherent risk setting, auditors may not be willing to rely 
on internal auditors who monitor weak controls. This 
suggests that inherent risk and control design strength may 
interact to affect auditors' decisons to rely on internal 
audit functions. Thus, the following hypotheses will also 
be examined in this study. 
H5: The extent to which auditors rely on internal 
audit functions will depend upon the interactive effect of 
control design strength and inherent risk. 
The remaining hypotheses address the potential three 
way interactions between control design strength, inherent 
risk and each of the respective SAS No. 9 factors. 
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H6a: The extent to which internal audit objectivity 
affects auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions will be dependent upon the interactive affect of 
control design strength and inherent risk. 
H6b: The extent to which internal audit competence 
affects auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions will depend upon the interactive effect of 
control design strength and inherent risk. 
H6c: The extent to which the work performed by the 
internal auditors affects auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal audit functions will depend upon the interactive 
effect of control design strength and inherent risk. 
The Effects of The Three SAS No. _9 Factors. Consistent 
with previous studies concerning internal audit functions, 
the study will also examine the main effects of 
objectivity, competence, and work performed. In addition, 
although previous research has indicated that these factors 
only affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions in 
an additive fashion, this study will also investigate the 
possibility that interactions between these factors may 
exist within certain inherent risk/control strength 
conditions. 
Auditors' Decisions to Use Internal Auditors as 
Assistants 
The Role of Inherent Risk. SAS No. 9 states that one way 
an auditor can rely on the internal audit function is to 
rely on the internal auditors as assistants when performing 
audit testing. In other words, the independent auditor can 
allocate a portion of audit work to the internal auditors. 
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SAS No. 9 also suggests that auditors assess the 
competence, objectivity, and work of the internal audit 
function in making such decisions. Because the use of 
internal auditors as assistants may affect both control 
risk and detection risk, the final set of hypotheses 
examined in this study investigate whether the inherent 
risk of an audit area affects auditors' decisions to rely 
on internal auditors as assistants. Further, they will 
examine whether factors associated with inherent risk 
interact with the objectivity, competence, and work of the 
internal audit function in affecting auditors' reliance on 
internal auditors as assistants. 
Similar to auditors' decisions to rely on internal 
audit functions in making control reliance decisions, the 
exact nature of the relationship between inherent risk and 
auditors' decisions to rely on internal auditors as 
assistants is difficult to determine. One possibility is 
that auditors may weight the factors associated with the 
internal audit function more heavily in high inherent risk 
situations than in low risk situations. In other words, 
auditors may feel the guality of the internal audit 
function is more important when the area being audited has 
a higher level of inherent risk. This is consistent with 
the way the audit risk model suggests that inherent risk 
affects such decisions. According to the audit risk model 
and the findings of Libby et al. (1985), a reduction in 
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audit test strength has a greater impact on audit risk in 
areas of high inherent risk than in areas of low inherent 
risk. It can be assumed that if internal auditors assist 
auditors in the performance of additional audit testing, 
the strength of the tests performed will be affected. 
Therefore, the use of internal auditors who lack 
objectivity and/or competence may greatly increase audit 
risk in areas of high inherent risk. Alternatively, the 
use of the same internal auditors in an area of low 
inherent risk may affect audit risk to a lesser degree. 
However, the possibility also exists that in situations of 
high inherent risk auditors may feel they should perform a 
majority of the work themselves and therefore, may be 
reluctant to rely on internal auditors as assistants. As a 
result, auditors may rely less on internal auditors as 
assistants in situations of high inherent risk than in 
situations of low inherent risk. If this is the case, then 
the effect of the objectivity, competence, and work of the 
internal audit function on auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal auditors as assistants will be greater in 
situations of low inherent risk than in situations of high 
inherent risk. 
Given the difficulty in determining the exact nature 
of the relationship between inherent risk and auditors' 
decisions to use internal auditors as assistants, 
hypotheses addressing (1) whether inherent risk affects 
auditors' decisions to rely on internal auditors as 
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assistants and (2) whether inherent risk interacts with the 
three SAS No. 9 factors in affecting such decisions, will 
be tested. Subsequent to testing these hypotheses, this 
study will attempt to determine the exact nature of the 
relationship between inherent risk and auditors' decisions 
to use internal auditors as assistants. 
The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
H7: The extent to which auditors rely on internal 
auditors as assistants will be affected by the level of 
inherent risk in the area being examined. 
H8a: The effect of internal audit competence on the 
extent to which auditors rely on internal auditors as 
assistants will be affected by the level of inherent risk 
in the area being examined. 
H8b: The effect of internal audit objectivity on the 
extent to which auditors rely on internal auditors as 
assistants will be affected by the level of inherent risk 
in the area being examined. 
H8c: The effect of the work performed by the internal 
audit function on the extent to which auditors rely on 
internal auditors as assistants will be affected by the 
level of inherent risk in the area being examined. 
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PART II: Methodology 
Overview 
This study employs a split plot analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) design. Factors associated with inherent risk and 
control design strength were manipulated as between subject 
variables and factors associated with the competence, 
objectivity, and work of the internal audit function were 
manipulated as within subject variables. Auditors were 
randomly assigned to one between factor group and were 
required to make several audit planning decisions for a 
series of audit cases in which factors associated with the 
internal audit function were manipulated. 
Subjects 
Audit managers from the public accounting firm of 
Peat, Marwick, Main & Co. were employed as subjects in the 
study. All subjects participated in the study while 
attending training sessions at the firm's facility in 
Montvale, N.J. In total, 80 responses were received, of 
which 67 (84%) were usable. All subjects had at least four 
years of audit experience and all had experience auditing 
clients with internal audit functions. On average, 
subjects had six years of audit experience. 
Experimental Task 
Subjects were asked to complete an audit planning case 
that required them to make several planning decisions 
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concerning an examination of the collectibility of the 
receivables of a medium sized manufacturing company. The 
case materials included a general description of the 
company and its business environment, detailed information 
concerning the composition and age of the company's 
receivables, and a detailed description of the company's 
controls over credit approval. 
The inherent risk and control design strength 
variables were manipulated as between subject variables 
within the case information. Inherent risk was manipulated 
at two levels (high/low) by changing the nature of the 
company's industry and business environment. Control 
design strength was also manipulated at two levels 
(strong/weak) by changing the comprehensiveness of the 
controls over the credit approval process. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of these four experimental 
conditions. 
Subjects also received eight different descriptions of 
internal audit functions. These eight descriptions 
represented all possible combinations of the variables that 
were used to represent the three factors discussed in SAS 
No. 9. Internal audit competence, objectivity, and work 
performed were each represented by one variable manipulated 
at two levels (see Figure 1). The order of the three 
internal audit variables was randomized across the case 
descriptions and the order of the cases was randomized 
across subjects. The subjects also received a ninth case 
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* CONTROL DESIGN STRENGTH 
* INHERENT 
RISK 
HIGH 
LOW 
STRONG WEAK 
* * * * * * 
* * * * * * 
* BETWEEN SUBJECT FACTORS 
*** WITHIN SUBJECT FACTORS 
1. LEVEL OF COMPETENCE (HIGH, LOW). 
2. LEVEL OF COMPREHENSIVENESS OF WORK PERFORMED (HIGH, 
LOW) . 
3. LEVEL OF OBJECTIVITY (HIGH, LOW). 
Figure 3.1 Design of the Experiment 
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which described the company as having no internal audit 
department. For each of the internal audit descriptions, 
the subjects were asked to determine: (1) the level of 
planned reliance they would be willing to place on the 
controls over the company's credit approval process, (2) 
the number of audit hours they would be willing to budget 
for the purpose of auditing the collectibility of the 
company's receivables and (3) the number of budgeted hours 
of audit work they would be willing to assign to ABC's 
internal audit staff. For the case which described ABC Co. 
as being without an internal audit department, subjects 
were asked to respond to questions (1) and (2) specified 
above. A copy of the instrument is contained in Appendix A 
(see Exhibit 10). 
Task Setting 
The manufacturing industry was selected for the case 
setting based upon statistics found in Macchiaverna (1978) 
which indicate that internal audit staffs in manufacturing 
firms spend a larger percentage of their time performing 
duties related to reviewing compliance with internal 
controls than do internal auditors in other industries such 
as banking or retailing. An examination of the 
collectibility of receivables was chosen because it is an 
integral element in an audit of the sales and receivables 
cycle. 
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Response Variables 
The Planned Control Reliance Decision. Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (Section 320) indicate that auditors 
should perform a preliminary review as the first step in 
the process of evaluating internal control for reliance 
purposes. The preliminary review is performed in order to 
obtain knowledge and understanding of the prescribed 
control procedures and methods. Upon completion of the 
review, the auditor should be able to make an evaluation 
concerning the extent to which the internal control system 
can be relied upon to restrict audit testing. More 
specifically, the review is used as the basis for planning 
compliance testing and for an initial determination of the 
extent of substantive testing that must be performed. 
Peat, Marwick, Main & Co. has formalized this process in 
their Compliance Test of Details Worksheet (see Elliott, 
1983). The worksheet requires that their auditors 
determine the specific level of planned reliance they would 
place upon the system of control in each audit area. The 
auditor selects a level of planned reliance ranging from 0 
to 3. Selection of a "0" means that no reliance will be 
placed upon the control system. Thus, no compliance 
testing will be performed and substantive testing will not 
be restricted. The selection of a "3" means that a maximum 
level of reliance will be placed on the control system, 
resulting in extensive compliance testing and the greatest 
restriction on substantive testing. 
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The planned reliance decision incorporates the extent 
of planned reliance the auditor is willing to place on the 
internal audit function as an element of the described 
system of control. Subjects could have been asked to 
indicate the extent of planned reliance they would place on 
the internal audit function. However, discussions with 
auditors indicate that they do not explicitly make such 
decisions with respect to specific audit areas. They 
indicated that they make overall planned reliance decisions 
for particular audit areas, which incorporate the extent of 
reliance they place on the internal audit function in that 
area. 
Since the planned reliance decision is made as part of 
the auditor's evaluation of internal control and because it 
has such an impact on audit planning, it was selected as 
one of the response variables for this investigation. 
Specifically, subjects were asked to do the following: 
"Please indicate (on the scale provided) the level of 
planned reliance you would be willing to place on the 
controls over the credit approval process for ABC Company 
for the purpose of auditing the collectibility of their 
accounts receivabale." 
A ten point scale (0 - no reliance, 9 - maximum 
reliance) was used for the planned reliance response (see 
Appendix A, Exhibit 9). The use of a ten point scale for 
such a decision is consistent with Libby et al. (1985). 
Libby et al. expanded the four point reliance scale 
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currently used by Peat, Marwick, Main & Co. in order to 
allow auditors to make "finer distinctions among internal 
control systems." Libby et al. found that use of the 
expanded scale did not affect the magnitude and direction 
of their results and did not create any difficulty for 
subjects. Pilot testing of the case instrument for this 
study also indicated that auditors had no problem with the 
expanded reliance scale. 
Also consistent with Libby et al. (1985), auditors 
were asked to make planned reliance judgments for an 
individual accounting process rather than for an aggregated 
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accounting cycle. Interactions between the internal 
controls of individual processes can create problems with 
applying the audit risk model at aggregated levels (Libby 
et al., 1985). This has been noted as one of the major 
limitations of the audit risk model (Cushing and Loebbecke, 
1983) . By having auditors make reliance judgments 
concerning the controls over an individual accounting 
6 
process, these problems were avoided. 
The Audit Hours Decision. Subjects were also asked to 
determine the number of audit hours they would budget for 
auditing the collectibility of the company's receivables 
(see Appendix A, Exhibit 9). Specifically, they were asked 
the following: 
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"Please indicate the total number of audit hours you 
would budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC 
Company's receivables." 
This second measure of reliance was included because 
of concerns that the planned control reliance decision, 
although expanded to a ten point scale, would still not be 
sensitive enough to detect higher order interactions 
between the treatment variables. It was felt that budgeted 
audit hours would allow for a more precise measurement of 
the extent to which auditors rely upon internal audit 
functions. There was no problem with asking auditors to 
make both of these judgments because auditors typically set 
up an initial audit budget based upon their control 
reliance judgments. Also, audit hours was included as a 
response variable because auditors formally make audit hour 
determinations for audit areas within accounting cycles. 
The Decision to Use the Internal Auditors as Assistants, 
Lastly, in order to examine auditors' decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants, subects were asked to 
specify the number of budgeted hours of audit work they 
would to assign to company's internal auditors (see 
Appendix A, Exhibit 9). Specifically, the subjects were 
asked the following: 
"Based on the number of hours you indicated above, 
please specify the number of budgeted hours of audit work 
you would be willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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This decision is normally made as part of the audit 
planning process. 
Treatment Variables 
The following sections describe the manipulations of 
each of the treatment variables that were used in the 
study. The first section addresses the between subject 
variables and the second section addresses the within 
subject variables. Finally, section three discusses the 
process of pilot testing each of the variable 
manipulations. 
Between Subject Variables 
Inherent Risk. Inherent risk is the susceptibility 
of an account balance or class of transactions to 
material error irrespective of any related internal 
accounting controls. This variable was examined by 
manipulating factors that affect auditors' assessments of 
the inherent risk associated with the proper valuation of 
accounts receivable. Through discussions with several 
managers and partners from big eight public accounting 
firms, it was determined that the nature of the client's 
industry and business environment was a major factor 
affecting auditors' inherent risk assessments in the 
accounts receivable area. Therefore, inherent risk was 
manipulated by varying the nature of the client's customer 
base. This manipulation is consistent with SAS No. 47 
which suggests that sensitivity to external forces and 
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characteristics of the industry in which the company 
operates be considered in assessing inherent risk. 
Inherent risk was manipulated at two levels, high and 
low (see Appendix A, Exhibits 2 and 3). In both 
conditions, the client was described as a manufacturing 
company. In the high risk condition the company was 
described as, "a manufacturer and distributor of eguipment 
and supplies to companies involved in the oil extraction 
and exploration industry." It was also indicated that 
"...because of the problems the oil industry has incurred 
during the past year, many oil companies are undergoing 
serious economic difficulties and therefore may be poor 
credit risks." In the low risk condition, the company was 
described as "a manufacturer and distributor of eguipment 
and supplies to large medical institutions." Subjects were 
also informed that "such institutions are generally 
considered to be good credit risks, as they have a low risk 
of default." 
In order to provide a complete set of information and 
to control for other factors which may affect inherent 
risk, identical detailed financial information was provided 
in both the high and low risk conditions. For example, in 
both manipulations the client was described as having $80 
million in sales, $17 million in outstanding receivables, 
and an $810,000 allowance for doubtful accounts balance. 
The client was also described as having an accounts 
receivable balance consiting of 600 accounts ranging from 
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approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. The identical 
accounts receivable aging schedule was also included in the 
case materials for both manipulations. 
Control Design Strength. The control design strength 
variable was examined by manipulating the comprehensiveness 
of the company's credit approval process at two levels (see 
Appendix A, Exhibits 4 and 5). In the strong control 
condition, the process was described as being quite 
rigorous. For example, the credit approval process for new 
customers was described as involving the aquisition of 
credit information from a number of sources. 
"... the credit department obtains a list of the 
customer's vendors and the name of the customer's primary 
banking institution. The department contacts two of the 
customer's vendors, the customer's bank, and the Dunn and 
Bradstreet credit information service for the purpose of 
obtaining standard credit information about the customer... 
The credit manager was described as using this 
information to either reject the order or to set a credit 
limit for the customer. 
In the strong control condition, the handling of 
repeat customers was also described as being very rigorous. 
"...for repeat customers the system checks to see if 
an order from the customer has been rejected within the 
past year. If so, the customer's order is not 
processed.... If the customer has receivables that are 60 
days or more past due, the order is not processed and the 
customer is notified. If however, the customer's last 
credit rating was acceptable and the customer has no past 
due receivables, then the information concerning the 
customer and the order is sent to the credit department. 
If the customer had a detailed credit review performed 
within the past 30 days then only a follow-up review is 
performed. The follow-up review consists of obtaining 
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information from Dunn and Bradstreet and the customer's 
bank and reassessing the credit limit. If a detailed 
credit review has not been performed within the past 30 
days, then the detailed credit check described above is 
performed." 
In the weak control condition, the credit approval 
process was described as being much less comprehensive. 
For example, the process was described as not involving the 
acquisition of extensive credit information and not 
requiring that a credit review be performed as frequently 
as in the strong control condition. 
"If the order is from a new customer, the system 
checks the customer credit reference file to see if two 
credit references are available for the customer. The 
credit references are obtained from two of the customer's 
vendors. The reference form asks the vendor to provide 
standard credit information concerning the customer. The 
sales person responsible for acquiring the order is 
responsible for obtaining the credit references... If the 
credit references are available for a new customer, then 
the order is automatically processed by the system. 
If the order is from a repeat customer, the system 
checks to see if the customer has any oustanding 
receivables with ABC Company... If the record shows that 
the customer has any receivables that are 90 days or more 
past due, the order is rejected... If the customer's 
record shows that there are no receivables that are 90 days 
or more past due, then the credit sale is automatically 
processed. 
Within Subject Variables 
Internal Audit Competence, Internal audit competence was 
manipulated by changing the level of experience possessed 
by the internal audit staff (see Appendix A, Exhibit 6). 
In the high competence condition, members of the staff were 
described as follows: 
"The department consists mainly of former Big Eight 
auditors with at least 3 years of audit experience. Most 
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of the internal auditors have been with the company for at 
least 4 years. The department head has been with the 
company for 8 years." 
In the low competence condition, staff members were 
described as having limited audit experience. For example, 
they were described in the following manner: 
The department consists mainly of individuals without 
college degrees and recent college graduates with degrees 
in accounting and no previous work experience. The head of 
the department has been with the company for 30 years and 
is nearing retirement." 
These manipulations were based on the findings of 
Schneider (1984). As part of his study, he conducted an 
experiment to determine which variables explained the most 
variance with respect to each of the factors discussed in 
SAS No. 9. He found that (1) the experience level of the 
internal auditors and (2) the quality and amount of 
instruction/supervision given by senior internal audit 
personnel. In an effort to keep the number of variables 
manipulated in this study to a reasonable number, these 
factors were combined into one variable. 
Internal Audit Objectivity. Internal audit objectivity was 
manipulated by changing the organizational level to which 
the internal audit department reports (see Appendix A, 
Exhibit 7). In the high objectivity condition, the 
department was described as reporting to an "independent 
audit committee". In the low objectivity condition, the 
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internal auditors were described as reporting to the 
"company controller". As implied by SAS No. 9, the 
organizational level to which the internal audit department 
reports is an important consideration when evaluating 
internal audit objectivity. SAS No. 9 states: 
"When considering the objectivity of internal 
auditors, the independent auditors should consider the 
organizational level to which internal auditors report the 
results of their work and the organizational level to which 
they report administratively. This frequently is an 
indication of their ability to act independently of the 
individuals responsible for the function being audited." 
(AICPA, 1975) 
This manipulation of internal audit objectivity is 
consistent with that used by Schneider (1984, 1985) and 
Abdel-khalik et al. (1983). 
The Work of the Internal Audit Function. Work performed 
was manipulated by changing the comprehensiveness of the 
audit procedures performed by the internal auditors (see 
Appendix A, Exhibit 8). In the high comprehensive 
condition, the internal auditors were described as 
performing "detailed tests on the system... to determine 
whether the required credit information is being obtained 
for all customers and whether the decisions to grant credit 
are being made consistent with company policy." In the low 
comprehensive condition, the auditors were described as 
"periodically observing credit approval activities and 
making inquiries of credit department personnel." These 
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manipulations are consistent with the test strength 
manipulations employed by Libby et. al (1985) . 
Pi lot Testing of Case Materials 
In the process of developing the case materials, 
several pilot tests were performed. One purpose for these 
tests was to make sure the case materials were complete and 
realistic. A second purpose was to determine the adequacy 
of the variable manipulations. In other words, to 
determine whether (1) the high inherent risk manipulation 
was significantly higher in risk than the low inherent risk 
manipulation, (2) the strong control design strength 
manipulation was significantly stronger than the weak 
control design strength manipulation, etc. After the 
initial case materials were developed, the first pilot test 
was conducted. Four versions of the first pilot test were 
created so that subjects would not be required to evaluate 
more than one level of the two between subject variables. 
Each version contained three parts in that subjects were 
required to evaluate one level of the inherent risk 
variable, one level of the control design strength 
variable, and all levels of each of the three within 
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subject, internal audit variables. Subjects performed 
these evaluations using scales which were developed for 
each respective variable (see Appendix B). 
The first pilot test was administered to 20 managers 
at one of Peat, Marwick, Main & Co.'s offices. Thirteen 
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useable responses were received. The results of the first 
pilot test show that based upon an eleven point scale 
(where, 0 = no inherent risk, 10 = high inherent risk, 
etc..) the high inherent risk manipulation received a mean 
rating of 8.67, while the low inherent risk manipulation 
was given a rating of 4.71. The means were found to be 
significantly different at the p< .01 level. Similarly, 
the control strength manipulations were also found to be 
significantly different at the p< .01 level. Using an 
eleven point scale (where, 0 = the process is very weak, 10 
= the process is very strong, etc..), the strong control 
design strength manipulation received a mean control 
strength rating of 8.50 and the weak control strength 
description received a rating of 3.57. Finally, the 
manipulations of the three internal audit variables were 
also found to be significantly different at the p< .01 
level. Using an eleven point scale (where, 0 = a very low 
level of competence, 10 = a very high level of competence, 
etc..), the high competence variable manipulation received 
a mean competence rating of 9.00 while the low competence 
manipulation received a 1.80 rating. Also using an eleven 
point scale (where, 0 = a very low level of objectivity, 10 
= a very high level of objectivity, etc..), the high 
objectivity manipulation received a mean objectivity rating 
of 8.60 and the low objectivity manipulation received a 
1.80 rating. Lastly, an eleven point scale was also used 
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to evaluate the work performed variable (where, 0 = a very 
low level of comprehensiveness, 10 = a very high level of 
comprehensiveness, etc..), the highly comprehensive work 
performed manipulation received a comprehensiveness rating 
of 8.90 and the low comprehensiveness manipulation received 
a rating of 3.60. 
Retesting of the Inherent Risk Variable 
Following the first pilot test, four Peat, Marwick, 
Main & Co. audit managers were sent copies of the initial 
version of the final instrument and asked to comment on the 
realism and completeness of the case information. These 
auditors were individually contacted by phone for their 
responses. Extensive discussions with them indicated that 
a few changes needed to be made to the background 
information. Specifically, it was determined that a 
receivables aging schedule should be included in the case 
materials. All of the auditors interviewed indicated that 
they could make the reguired audit planning decisions 
without an aging schedule. However, most of them felt that 
including an aging schedule in the background materials 
would make the case more complete. 
Originally, the decision not to include an aging 
schedule was made because of the concern that it might 
interfere with the inherent risk manipulations. However, 
with the assistance of several practicing auditors, a 
schedule was constructed which was intended not to greatly 
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affect inherent risk. To insure that this was the case, a 
second pilot test was performed. Two versions of the 
second pilot test were created, each containing one level 
of the inherent risk variable and the new set of background 
information. Subjects were asked to assess the level of 
inherent risk using the same scale contained in part I of 
the first pilot test. The test was administered to 10 
subjects. The results indicated that the risk 
manipulations were not adversly affected by the inclusion 
of the aging schedule. The high inherent risk manipulation 
received a mean rating of 9.00, while the low inherent risk 
manipulation received a 4.40 rating. The ratings were 
found to be significantly different at the p< .01 level. 
Subsequent to the second pilot test, concern was 
expressed that the low inherent risk case might not contain 
a low enough level of inherent risk. In an effort to lower 
the risk level of this case, some minor changes were made 
to the case materials. Specifically, a comment indicating 
that no collectibility problems had been found during 
previous audits was included in the low risk case. 
Additional discussions with practicing auditors further 
indicated that including information concerning the balance 
in the allowance for doubtful accounts would make the case 
more complete. Therefore, such information was added to 
the background information. Lastly, the wording of several 
phrases was changed in an attempt to more clearly convey 
the information contained in the cases. Since these 
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changes only affected the inherent risk variable, a third 
pilot test was performed to assess the affect of these 
changes on the inherent risk evaluations. The test was 
administered to 6 Peat, Marwick, Main & Co. managers. 
Using the same scales that were used in the first two pilot 
tests, the results indicated that the high and low inherent 
risk manipulations were, as before, significantly different 
at the p< .01 level. The results also showed that the low 
inherent risk case received a slightly lower risk rating 
than it had in the previous pilot tests. Specifically, the 
high inherent risk rating was 9.25 and the low inherent 
risk rating was 4.00. 
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CHAPTER I V 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data 
collected in this study and a description of the results. 
The first section addresses auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal functions. It contains the results of the 
analyses on auditors' decisions concerning budgeted audit 
hours and their planned reliance judgments. The second 
section addresses auditors' decisions to utilize internal 
auditors as assistants. It presents the analyses of the 
number of hours of audit work assigned to the internal 
audit function. Finally, section three contains the 
analyses and results concerning the relative importance of 
the three SAS No. 9 factors (objectivity, competence and 
work performed) in auditors' decisions to rely on internal 
auditors and in their decisions to use internal auditors as 
assistants. 
Reliance On Internal Auditors: The Audit Hours Decision 
Auditor reliance on internal audit functions was first 
examined using the audit hour judgments provided by the 
subjects. The subjects raw audit hour judgments were used 
to calculate percentage difference scores. These scores 
were calculated by subtracting the number of audit hours 
each auditor assigned in the "no internal audit function" 
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case from the number of audit hours they assigned in each 
of the internal audit description cases. This amount was 
then divided by the number of hours the auditor assigned in 
the "no internal audit function" case. The resulting 
amount represents the percentage difference in budgeted 
audit hours due to the existence of the internal audit 
function. The percentage differences scores were 
calculated for several reasons. First, inherent risk and 
control strength affect auditors' planning decisions 
irrespective of the existence of an internal audit function 
(Libby et al. , 1983.) Therefore, the number of hours 
assigned in the "no internal audit function" case had to be 
subtracted from the hours assigned in each of the internal 
audit function cases or the main effects of inherent risk 
and control strength on auditors' decisions concerning 
internal audit functions would not have been detectable. 
Percentage differences scores were calculated because an 
analysis of the raw difference scores would have been 
misleading. For example, based upon the raw difference 
scores a change in audit hours from 100 to 90 is equivelent 
to a change from 10 to 0. Also, there was a concern that 
response variability associated with the raw audit hour 
judgments would prevent significant effects from being 
detected (Margheim, 1986). The percentage difference 
scores were considered an attempt to reduce the variation 
in the auditors' judgments. 
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Descriptive statistics for the raw audit hour 
judgments and the percentage difference scores are 
8 
presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2. The analysis of the 
percentage difference scores was conducted using the 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) approach for 
9 
analyzing split plot designs. The MANOVA program in SPSS 
was used for the analysis and a full factorial model was 
specified. In the analysis, the percentage difference 
scores were defined as the dependent variable, inherent 
risk and control design strength were employed as between 
subject variables, and internal audit objectivity, 
competence and work performed were employed as within 
subject variables. 
A test of the homogeneity of variance assumption for 
analysis of variance was conducted using the Bartlett-Box F 
test and Cochran's C test. The results of these tests 
indicated that the homogeneity of variance assumption was 
violated at the p=.01 level. However, analysis of variance 
procedures are considered to be robust to violations of 
this assumption provided the number of observations in each 
treatment group are approximately equal (Cochran, 1947; 
Kirk, 1968). Given that the number of observations in each 
group are 17, 17, 16, and 16 respectively, violation of 
this assumption was not felt to be a major concern. 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.3. 
An examination of the table indicates that the within 
subject variables of objectivity, competence and work 
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Table 4.1 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations of 
the Raw Audit Hour Judgments 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
IA 
VARIABLES 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
OBJ COMP WP 
H H H 47.6 
(26.3) 
56.7 
(67.1) 
41.5 
(27.9) 
32.7 
(22.6) 
H H L 57.3 
(41.6) 
60.5 
(78.5) 
45.0 
(32.9) 
37.2 
(24.2) 
H L H 56.4 
(43.5) 
64.2 
(79.0) 
46.1 
(30.9) 
36.1 
(22.9) 
H L L 64.1 
(52.1) 
64.4 
(79.1) 
46.2 
(31.2) 
40.9 
(29.1) 
L H H 57.4 
(42.8) 
62.2 
(77.7) 
42.6 
(30.1) 
38.1 
(28.5) 
L H L 62.2 
(49.1) 
63.7 
(78.2) 
44.1 
(32.6) 
39.5 
(29.7) 
L L H 63.0 
(48.5) 
65.3 
(78.8) 
46.6 
(31.4) 
38.8 
(28.5) 
L L L 62.5 
(42.7) 
69.7 
(89.9) 
46.2 
(31.7) 
39.4 
(25.4) 
Between Group Means 58.8 63.3 44.8 37.8 
72 
Table 4.2 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations of 
the Percentage Difference Scores 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
T A 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
VARIABLES Strong Weak Strong Weak 
OBJ COMP WP 
H H H -.272 -.132 -.099 -.214 
(.219) (.190) (.380) (.220) 
H H L -.197 -.107 -.093 -.098 
(.173) (.179) (.193) (.158) 
H L H -.191 -.053 -.027 -.136 
(.171) ( .122) (.248) (.194) 
H L L -.106 .052 -.032 -.026 
(.145) ( .108) (.208) (.067) 
L H H -.189 -.064 -.118 -.092 
(.178) (.120) (.286) (.153) 
L H L -.135 -.050 -.124 -.062 
(.172) (.101) (.192) (.151) 
L L H -.112 -.029 -.020 -.075 
( .138) (.107) (.252) (.171) 
L L L -.102 .015 -.043 -.042 
(.119) (.154) (.167) (.106) 
Between Group Means -.163 -.059 -.069 -.093 
73 
Table 4.3 
Analysis of Variance for Percentage Difference Scores 
Source of Variation D.F. M.S. F P 
Main Effects 
Inherent Risk (IR) 1 .117 .67 .416 
Control Strength (CS) 1 .212 1.22 .274 
Objectvity (0) 1 .180 10.69 .002 
Competence (C) 1 .529 19.10 .001 
Work (W) 1 .167 7.82 .007 
Two Way Interactions 
IR X CS 1 .538 3.08 .084 
0 X IR 1 .044 2.63 .110 
0 X CS 1 .031 1.85 .178 
C X IR 1 .000 .00 .946 
C X CS 1 .015 .55 .463 
0 X C 1 .013 2.34 .130 
W X IR 1 .001 .05 .819 
W X CS 1 .016 .77 .383 
0 X W 1 .033 5.38 .023 
C X W 1 .001 .18 .671 
Three Way Interactions 
0 X IR X CS 1 .037 2.22 .141 
C X IR X CS 1 .003 .11 .737 
0 X C X IR 1 .001 .08 .778 
0 X C X CS 1 .009 1.58 .213 
W X IR X CS 1 .108 5.11 .027 
0 X W X IR 1 .008 1.32 .256 
0 X W X CS 1 .000 .00 .962 
C X W X IR 1 .000 .00 .990 
C X W X CS 1 .002 .25 .617 
0 X C X w 1 .000 .00 .958 
Four Way Interactions 
0 X C X IR X CS 1 .018 3.14 .081 
0 X W X IR X CS 1 .035 5.65 .020 
C X W X IR X CS 1 .000 .02 .891 
0 X C X W X IR 1 .000 .00 .975 
0 X C X W X CS 1 .007 1.31 .256 
Five Way Interaction 
OXCXW X IR X CS 1 .004 .78 .381 
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performed are significant at the p=.002, p=.001, and p=.007 
levels respectively. The results also show that the 
interaction between objectivity and work performed is 
significant at the p=.023 level. More importantly, 
however, the results show that several interactions 
concerning the between subject variables are also 
significant. The work performed by inherent risk by 
control strength interaction is significant at the .027 
level, and the four way interaction between objectivity, 
work performed, inherent risk, aod control design strength 
is significant at the p=.020 level. Also, the inherent 
risk by control strength interaction is significant at the 
p=.084 level, and the and the objectivity by competence by 
inherent risk by control strength interaction is 
significant at the p=.081 level. 
The significance of these interaction terms indicates 
that inherent risk and control strength do affect auditors' 
internal audit reliance decisions. They also indicate that 
inherent risk and control strength affect these decisions 
in a very complex fashion. This is evidenced by the fact 
that the inherent risk and control strength main effect 
terms are insignificant despite being included in 
significant interaction terms. An examination of the 
between subject group means contained in Table 4.2, 
indicates that the effect of control strength on auditors' 
reliance decisions is dependent upon the level of inherent 
risk and vice-versa. The mean percentage decrease in audit 
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hours in the high inherent risk/strong control group is 
16.3% but in the high inherent risk/weak control group the 
mean decrease is only 5.8%. In the low inherent 
risk/strong control group the mean decrease is 7% and in 
the low inherent risk/weak control group the mean decrease 
is 9.2%. Thus, the complex nature of the interaction 
between inherent risk and control strength appears to 
reduce the significance of the main effects of each of 
these variables. 
Given the significance of the two four way interaction 
terms, it was not meaningful to investigate the significant 
main effect and lower order interaction terms. Therefore, 
in order to further examine the effect of inherent risk and 
control strength on auditors' internal audit reliance 
decisions, the next step in the analysis involved an 
indepth examination of the two four way interactions. The 
results of these analyses were then used to test the 
hypotheses relating to auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal auditors. 
Prior to examining these interaction terms it is 
important to note that analyses were also performed using 
the raw audit hour judgments and the raw difference scores 
(the number of hours assigned in each of the internal audit 
function cases minus the hours assigned in the "no internal 
audit function" case.) These analyses were performed to 
alleviate the concern that the calculation of the 
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percentage difference scores were some how driving the 
results. Given that the "no internal audit function" case 
was always the last of the nine cases presented to the 
subjects, the analysis of the raw audit hour judgments was 
especially important. The results of these analyses were 
basically the same as those results found using the 
percentage difference scores. All of the same effects were 
found to be significant; the only difference between the 
analyses was that the p-values were slightly lower in the 
analysis of the percentage difference scores. For example, 
the four way interaction between inherent risk, control 
strength, objectivity, and work performed was significant 
at the p=.043 level for the raw audit hour judgments versus 
the p=.027 level using the percentage difference scores. 
As discussed previously, this is probably to due to the 
fact that the percentage difference scores contain a 
smaller error variance. Also, there was a concern that the 
number of audit hours budgeted by the auditors might be 
affected by the number of hours the auditors planned to 
assign to the internal auditors. Therefore, a step-down 
analysis was performed on the percentage difference scores 
where the number of hours assigned to the internal auditors 
was entered into the analysis as the first explanatory 
variable, followed by the entry of the remaining variables; 
inherent risk, control strength, objectivity, competence, 
and work performed. The results of this analysis were not 
different from those found in the original analysis. 
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An Examination Into the Interaction Between Inherent Risk, 
Control Strength, Objectivity, and Work Performed 
This section contains an indepth examination of the 
four way interaction involving inherent risk, control 
strength, objectivity, and work performed, using multiple 
comparisons. Given that a multivariate approach was used 
in the overall analysis, the Roy & Bose procedure was used 
to conduct the multiple comparisons. The Roy & Bose 
procedure is the multivariate equivalent of the Scheffe 
procedure in that it controls the type I error rate across 
all possible comparisons concerning a set of means. In 
this case, a critical F value was determined so that 
multiple comparisons could be performed using any 
combination of the means contained in Table 4.2. The 
overall error rate was set at oc=.05. The means of the four 
combinations of the objectivity and work performed 
variables across the four combinations of the inherent risk 
and control design strength variables were tabulated and 
are presented in Table 4.4. Based upon an examination of 
Table 4.4, it appears that control design strength may be 
affecting the reliance placed upon internal audit functions 
differently depending on the level of inherent risk. In 
the high inherent risk case, the percentage decrease in 
audit hours for each of the internal audit functions 
appears to be greater in the strong control case than in 
the weak control case. However, in the low inherent risk 
condition the the same differences do not exist. 
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Table 4.4 
Cell Means of Percentage Difference Scores for 
OBJ X WP X IR X CS Interaction 
T A 
INHERENT RISK 
High 
CONTROL STRENGTH 
Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH 
VARIABLES Strong Weak Strong Weak 
OBJ WP 
H H -.232 -.092 -.062 -.175 
H L -.151 -.079 -.062 -.062 
L H -.150 -.046 -.069 -.083 
L L -.118 .018 -.083 -.051 
Between Group Means -.163 -.059 -.069 -.093 
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For example, in the high inherent risk condition the 
existence of the the high objectivity/low work performed 
internal audit function caused auditors to reduce their 
audit hour budgets by an average of 15% when controls were 
strong but by only 7.9% when controls were weak. In the 
low inherent risk condition the existence of the same 
internal audit function reduced auditors' budgets by an 
average of 6.2% regardless of the strength of the controls. 
This can also be seen by examining the between subject 
group means. 
As a result of these observations, comparisons were 
made between the means of the strong and weak control 
conditions for each of the four internal audit functions, 
within each of the inherent risk conditions. In other 
words, the means in column 1 of Table 4.4 were compared to 
the means in column 2, and the means in column 3 were 
compared to those in column 4. Table 4.5 shows the results 
of comparisons that were made within the high inherent risk 
condition and Table 4.6 shows the results of comparisons 
that were made within the low inherent risk condition. 
Note that in the high risk condition, three of the four 
comparisons are significant. Yet, in the low inherent risk 
condition, none of the four comparions are significant. 
Thus, it appears that auditors generally rely more on 
internal audit functions in strong control conditions than 
in weak control conditions when inherent risk is high. 
However, when inherent risk is low, control strength does 
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Table 4.5 
Comparisons Between Strong and Weak Controls 
Within the High Inherent Risk Condition 
(Columns 1 minus 2 from Table 4.4) 
OBJ WP p 
H H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 6.71 * 
H L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 2.22 
L H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 5.62 * 
L L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 5.85 * 
Table 4.6 
Comparisons Between Strong and Weak Controls 
Within Low Inherent Risk Condition 
(Columns 3 minus 4 from Table 4.4) 
OBJ WP F 
H H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 1.66 
H L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) .00 
L H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) .03 
L L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) .39 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for <x=.05, 
where s = 3, m=2, and n=27. 
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not appear to have the same affect on auditors' reliance 
decisions. 
The Effect of Inherent Risk Within Control Strength 
Conditions. Further examination of Table 4.4 suggests that 
within the strong control condition, auditors rely more on 
internal auditors when inherent risk is high, than when 
inherent risk is low. For example, in the strong control 
condition the existence of the high objectivity/high work 
performed internal audit function caused auditors to reduce 
their audit hour budgets by an average of 23.2% when 
inherent risk was high but by only 6.2% when inherent risk 
was low. Therefore, to further investigate the effect of 
inherent risk, comparisons were made to examine the impact 
of inherent risk on each of the internal audit functions 
described in Table 4.4, within each of the control strength 
conditions. The results, contained in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, 
show that none of the comparisons are significant. The 
only comparisons approaching significance (F= 4.19) is the 
comparison concerning the high objectivity/high work 
performed internal audit function within the strong control 
condition. No other comparison approaches significance. 
These results suggest that with the possible exception of 
high objectivity/high work performed internal audit 
functions within strong control conditions, auditors do not 
rely more on internal auditors in high inherent risk 
situations than in low inherent risk situations. One 
82 
Table 4.7 
Comparisons Between High and Low Inherent Risk 
Within Strong Control Strength Condition 
(Column 1 minus 3 from Table 4.4) 
OBJ WP F 
H H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 4.19 
H L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 2.51 
L H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 1.29 
L L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .46 
Table 4.8 
Comparisons Between High and Low Inherent Risk 
Within Weak Control Strength Condition 
(Columns 2 minus 4 from Table 4.4) 
OBJ WP F 
H H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 2.53 
H L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .09 
L H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .84 
L L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .84 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for Of=.05, 
where s = 3, m=2, and n=27. 
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reason for the results concerning the comparisons within 
the strong control condition may be the fact that the 
variances of the responses in the low inherent risk/strong 
control condition are relatively high, compared with those 
in the other between subject groups (see Table 4.2). 
Comparisons Within Between Subject Groups. The 
comparisons performed up to this point have provided 
information on how auditors relied upon the four internal 
audit functions described in Table 4.4 across the four 
inherent risk/control design strength treatment conditions. 
In an effort to gain insight into how auditors relied upon 
the four internal audit functions within each of the 
inherent risk/control strength conditions, additional 
comparisons were performed. An examination of Table 4.4 
indicates that with the exception of the low inherent 
risk/strong control condition, auditors appear to rely more 
on internal auditors that are highly objective and perform 
highly comprehensive work, than on auditors that are less 
objective and perform less comprehensive work. Table 4.9 
contains the results of comparisons that were performed 
between the four internal audit functions described in 
Table 4.4, within each of the inherent risk/control 
strength treatment conditions. The results show that there 
is no significant difference in the extent of reliance 
placed upon the four different internal audit functions in 
the low inherent risk/strong control condition. The 
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Table 4.9 
Comparisons Between I.A. Functions In 
Between Subject Groups 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
COMPARISON 
a 
H H - H L 
F F F F 
7.72 * .20 .00 14.59 
H H - L H 8.57 * 2.76 .04 10.41 
H H - L L 9.04 * 3.98 .29 10.08 
H L ~ L H .00 1.32 .04 .55 
H L - L L 1.85 6.53 * * .70 .16 
L H - L L 1.33 1.10 .24 1.26 
a 
The first letter designates the level of objectivity and 
the second designates the level of work performed. For 
example, H H - L L indicates a comparison between the 
High objectivity/High work performed internal audit 
function and the Low objectivity/Low work performed 
internal audit function. 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for <x=.05, 
where s = 3, m=2, and n = 2 7. 
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Table 4.10 
Comparisons Examining Effects of Objectivity and Work 
Performed In Between Subject Groups 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
COMPARISONS 
F F F F 
Main Effects: 
Objectivity 6.48 * 5.82 * .34 4.88 
Work Performed 4.99 .70 .08 7.87 * 
Interactions: 
Obj x WP 3.20 .35 .27 8.50 * 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for «=.05, 
where s=3, m=2, and n=27. 
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results also show that in varying degrees, objectivity and 
work performed do appear to affect the extent to which 
auditors rely on internal auditors in the other treatment 
conditions. 
Table 4.10 shows the results of comparisons examining 
the main effects and interactions of the objectivity and 
work performed variables within each of the inherent 
risk/control strength conditions. The results show that 
within the high inherent risk/strong control condition the 
objectivity main effect is significant (F=6.48), and the 
work performed main effect is approaching significance 
(F=4.99). The comparisons made within the high inherent 
risk/weak control condition indicate that a significant 
objectivity main effect exists (F=5.82), with no other 
effects approaching significance. Within the low inherent 
risk/strong control condition, none of the comparisons were 
found to be significant. Finally, within the low inherent 
risk/weak control condition, the work performed factor is 
significant (F=7.87), along with the objectivity by work 
performed interaction (F=8.50). These results indicate 
that objectivity and work performed do not affect auditors' 
internal audit reliance decisions across all inherent 
risk/control strength situations. In fact, when inherent 
risk is low and controls are strong, neither objectivity 
nor work performed affect auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal audit functions. 
87 
The Interaction Between Inherent Risk, Control Strength, 
Objectivity and Competence 
The next step in the analysis involved an examination 
of the four way interaction involving inherent risk, 
10 
control strength, objectivity, and competence. The means 
of the four combinations of the objectivity and competence 
variables across the four combinations of the inherent risk 
and control design strength variables were tabulated and 
are presented in Table 4.11. Comparisons examining the 
effects of control strength within inherent risk levels are 
contained in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. Similarly, comparisons 
examining the effects of inherent risk within levels of 
control strength are contained in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. 
The Roy and Bose procedure was also used for these 
comparisons and the same critical value was applied given 
the comparisons actually involved means from Table 4.2. 
The results of these comparisons are consistent with those 
found concerning the inherent risk by control strength by 
objectivity by work performed interaction. The results in 
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 indicate that control strength affects 
auditors' internal audit reliance decisions more when 
inherent risk is high than when it is low. The results in 
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 indicate that with the possible 
exception of when the internal audit function is highly 
objective and controls are strong, auditors do not rely 
more on internal auditors when inherent risk is high versus 
when it is low. 
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Table 4.11 
Cell Means of Percentage Difference Scores for 
OBJ X COMP X IR X CS Interaction 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
-L /I 
VARIABLES Strong Weak Strong Weak 
OBJ COMP 
H H -.469 -.240 -.192 -.313 
H L -.298 -.105 -.060 -.162 
L H -.325 -.115 -.243 -.154 
L L -.215 .015 -.063 -.117 
Between Group Means -.163 -.059 -.069 -.093 
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Table 4.12 
Comparisons Between Strong and Weak Controls 
Within the High Inherent Risk Condition 
(Columns 1 minus 2 from Table 4.5) 
OBJ COMP F 
H H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 3.27 
H L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 4.77 
L H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 4.75 
L L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) 5.87 * 
Table 4.13 
Comparisons Between Strong and Weak Controls 
Within Low Inherent Risk Condition 
(Columns 3 minus 4 from Table 4.5) 
OBJ COMP F 
H H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) .59 
H L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) • cn
 
00
 
L H (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) .45 
L L (STRONG CS - WEAK CS) .21 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for <x=.05, 
where s = 3, m=2, and n=27. 
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Table 4.14 
Comparisons Between High and Low Inherent Risk 
Within Strong Control Strength Condition 
(Column 1 minus 3 from Table 4.5) 
OBJ COMP F 
H H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 3.11 
H L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 3.47 
L H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .36 
L L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 1.85 
Table 4.15 
Comparisons Between High and Low Inherent Risk 
Within Weak Control Strength Condition 
(Columns 2 minus 4 from Table 4.5) 
OBJ COMP F 
H H (HIGH IR ~ LOW IR) .34 
H L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .50 
L H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .20 
L L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) 1.37 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for <x=.05, 
where s=3, m=2, and n=27. 
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Comparisons were also performed to examine the effects 
of objectivity and competence within each of the between 
subject groups. The results of these comparisons are 
contained in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. The results in Table 
4.17 concerning objectivity are, of coarse, the same as 
those found in Table 4.10. With respect to competence, the 
results indicate that internal audit competence has a more 
significant affect on auditors' internal audit reliance 
decisions when controls are strong than when controls are 
weak. This is evidenced by the fact that competence 
significantly affects auditors' decisions at the x=.05 
level in both of the strong control groups. However, 
competence is not significant at this level in the weak 
control groups. The results also indicate that the 
objectivity by competence interaction approaches 
significance in only the low inherent risk/weak control 
condition. The interaction does not even approach 
significance in the other between subject groups. An 
examination of the low inherent risk/strong control 
condition in Table 4.16 provides insight into this 
interaction. The comparisons made between the four 
internal audit functions within the group indicate that 
auditors rely similarly on internal auditors whether they 
are lacking in objectivity or competence or both. The only 
situation in which they rely to a greater extent upon the 
internal auditors is when they are both objective and 
competent. An examination of Table 4.11 shows that 
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Table 4.16 
Comparisons Between I.A. Functions In 
Between Subject Groups 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
COMPARISON 
a 
H H - H L 
F F F F 
6.37 * 3.91 3.57 4.61 
H H - L H 5.77 * 4.35 .68 6.63 * * 
H H - L L 8.24 * 7.00 * 2.16 4.95 
H L - L H .22 .02 9.74 * .01 
H L - L L 3.90 4.59 .01 1.08 
L H - L L 3.60 3.03 9.25 * .39 
The first letter designates the level of objectivity and 
the second designates the level of competence. For 
example, H H - L L indicates a comparison between the 
High objectivity/High competence internal audit 
function and the Low objectivity/Low competence 
internal audit function. 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for ot=.05, 
where s=3, m=2, and n=27. 
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Table 4.17 
Comparisons Examining Effects of Objectivity and 
Competence In Between Subject Groups 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
COMPARISONS 
F F F F 
Main Effects: 
Objectivity 6.48 * 5.82 * .34 4.88 
Competence 6.04 * 4.19 7.01 * 2.52 
Interactions: 
Obj x Comp 1.42 .42 .76 4.52 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for <x=.05, 
where s = 3, m=2, and n=27. 
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auditors reduce their audit budgets by 31.3% when the 
internal auditors are objective and competent. They reduce 
their budgets by only 16.2%, 15.4%, and 11.7% respectively 
when the internal auditors lack one or both of these 
qualities. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
In general, the hypotheses relating to this portion of 
the study address whether inherent risk and control 
strength affect auditors' decisions to rely on internal 
audit functions and whether these variables affect 
auditors' judgments in a complex fashion by interacting 
with the three SAS No. 9 factors. Overall, the results 
indicate that inherent risk and control strength do affect 
auditors' reliance judgments. More importantly, the 
significance of the four way interaction term between 
inherent risk, control strength, objectivity and work 
performed, and the relative significance of the four way 
interaction between inherent risk, control strength, 
objectivity and competence, indicate that inherent risk and 
control strength affect auditors' judgments in an even more 
complex fashion than was hypothesized. 
With respect to the individual hypotheses, the 
significance of the four way interaction terms makes it 
difficult to perform direct tests of hypotheses Hl-K6c 
which, address main effects, two-way, and thay 
interactions. However, important conclusions can be drawn 
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by examining the nature of the relationships expressed 
within these hypotheses. For example, the first set of 
hypotheses address the role of inherent risk on auditors' 
decisions concerning internal auditors. Specifically HI 
relates to the main effect of inherent risk, and H2a-H2c 
address the interactions between inherent risk and the 
three SAS No. 9 variables. In the development of these 
hypotheses there was a guestion concerning the interaction 
between inherent risk and the three SAS No. 9 factors. The 
guestion concerned whether the multiplicative relationship 
expressed within the audit risk model would hold true. In 
other words, would the SAS No. 9 factors affect auditors' 
decisions more when inherent risk was high versus low, or 
would auditors be reluctant to rely on internal auditors 
when inherent risk was high, leading to the opposite 
results. An examination of Tables 4.10 and 4.17 reveals 
that when controls are strong the multiplicative 
relationship expressed by the audit risk model appears to 
partially hold true as the objectivity and work performed 
factors are more significant when inherent risk is high 
than when it is low (F=6.48 versus .35 for objectivity, and 
F=4.99 versus .08 for work performed.) However, when 
controls are weak, the multiplicative relationship does not 
appear to hold true as the work performed, objectivity by 
competence, and objectivity by work performed factors are 
more significant when inherent risk is low versus when it 
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is high (F=7.87 versus .70 for work performed, F= 4.52 
versus .42 for the objectivity by competence interaction, 
and F=8.50 versus .35 for the objectivity by work performed 
interaction.) Thus, the relationship between inherent risk 
and the three SAS No. 9 factors appears to be much more 
complex than that implied by the audit risk model. 
The second set of hypotheses address the effect of 
control strength. H3 hypothesizes that auditors will rely 
more on internal auditors in strong control settings than 
in weak control settings. H4a-H4c hypothesize that the 
three SAS No. 9 factors will have a greater effect on 
auditors' internal audit reliance decisions in strong 
versus weak control settings. The analyses in Tables 4.5 
and 4.6 as well as those in Tables 4.12 and 4.13, indicate 
that when inherent risk is high, auditors rely more on 
internal auditors when controls are strong versus when they 
are weak. However, when inherent risk is low, control 
strength does not have the same effect on auditors' 
internal audit reliance decisions. Therefore, the effect 
of control strength on auditors internal audit reliance 
decisions is much more complex than that stated in H3. 
Similarly, an examination of Tables 4.10 and 4.17 indicates 
that the same can be said for the interactions between 
control strength and the three SAS No. 9 variables. It 
appears that when inherent risk is high, all three SAS No. 
9 factors are more significant when controls are strong 
versus when they are weak. However, when inherent risk is 
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low the opposite appears to be true, as internal audit 
objectivity and work performed are more significant when 
controls are weak than when they are strong. 
Finally, H5 deals with the inherent risk/control 
strength interaction, and H6a-H6c address the interactions 
between inherent risk, control strength and the SAS No. 9 
factors. The results of the analyses presented in this 
section support these hypotheses to some extent. However, 
even these hypotheses do not fully express the complex 
relationships that exist between inherent risk, control 
strength, and internal audit objectivity, competence, and 
work performed. 
Summary of Results Concerning Audit Hours Variable 
Based upon auditors' audit hour planning decisions, 
inherent risk and control design strength appear to affect 
auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. Specifically, 
the extent to which auditors rely on internal audit 
functions appears to be dependent upon the four way 
interaction between inherent risk, control design strength, 
and internal audit objectivity and work performed. The 
results also show that auditors' internal audit reliance 
decisions may also be affected by the four way interaction 
between inherent risk, control design strength, objectivity 
and competence. Comparisons performed to investigate the 
interaction terms indicate that in high inherent risk 
situations auditors rely more on internal auditors in 
98 
strong control conditions than in weak control conditions. 
However, in low inherent risk conditions, auditors do not 
appear to rely more on internal auditors when controls are 
strong than when controls are weak. Comparisons also 
indicate that within high inherent risk/strong control 
conditions, the extent to which auditors rely on internal 
auditors in strong control conditions is significantly 
dependent upon the objectivity and competence of the 
internal auditors and to some extent upon their work 
performed. However, when inherent risk is high and 
controls are weak auditors' reliance decisions appear to be 
significantly affected by the objectivity of the internal 
auditors and to a lesser extent by their competence. In 
low inherent risk/strong control conditions, only 
competence significantly affects auditors' decisions. Both 
objectivity and work performed are highly insignificant. 
However, in low inherent risk/weak control conditions, 
auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit functions 
appear to be significantly dependent upon the work 
performed by the internal auditors and the interaction 
between internal audit objectivity and work performed. The 
significance of the interaction between objectivity and 
work performed within this treatment condition as well as 
the fact that the objectivity by competence interaction 
approaches significance, indicates that when making 
internal audit reliance decisions in low inherent risk/weak 
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control conditions, auditors may use a more complex 
decision process than they use in other inherent 
risk/control strength situations. 
Re1iance On Interna1 Auditors: Auditors' Planned Reliance 
Judgments 
Auditors' decisions to rely on internal auditors was 
also analyzed using auditors' planned reliance judgments. 
Auditors make planned reliance judgments to assist them in 
determining actual audit hours. Therefore, these judgments 
were intended to serve as proxies for audit hours. In 
order to examine these judgments, the portion of planned 
reliance attributable to the internal audit function had to 
be extracted from each planned reliance judgment. This had 
to be done because auditors' planned reliance judgments 
incorporate the reliance placed on the prescribed system of 
internal control and the reliance placed on the internal 
audit function. This extraction was accomplished by 
subtracting the level of planned reliance that each subject 
assigned in the "no internal audit function" case from the 
level of planned reliance they assigned in each of the 
eight internal audit cases. The analysis of these scores 
was conducted using the multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) approach for analyzing split plot designs. 
Specifically, the MANOVA program in SPSS was used for the 
analysis and a full factorial model was specified. In the 
analysis, the difference scores were employed as the 
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dependent variables, inherent risk and control design 
strength were employed as between subject variables, and 
internal audit objectivity, competence, and work performed 
were within subject variables. The cell means and standard 
deviations for the difference scores are reported in Table 
11 
4-18. The homogeneity of variance assumption was tested 
using the Bartlett-Box F test and Cochran's C test. This 
assumption was also violated at the p=.01 level in this 
analysis. However, as was discussed previously, this 
violation is not a concern given that the number of 
observations per treatment group are approximately equal. 
Results of Analysis 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.19. 
Examination of the table indicates that all of the within 
subject variables significantly affected auditors' planned 
reliance judgments. The main effects of objectivity, 
competence, and work performed were all significant at the 
p<.001 level. Interactions between these variables were 
also found to be significant. The objectivity by 
competence interaction was significant at the p=.003 level 
and the objectivity by competence by work performed 
interaction was significant at the p=.019 level. However, 
no significant effects were found for the inherent risk and 
control design strength variables. Therefore, the results 
of the analysis of auditors' planned reliance judgments do 
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Table 4.18 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for the 
Planned Reliance Judgments 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
IA 
VARIABLES 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
OBJ COMP WP 
H H H 6.82 
(3.37) 
4.76 
(3.70) 
4.87 
(3.32) 
6.00 
(3.50) 
H H L 5.00 
(3.16) 
3.82 
(3.67) 
3.18 
(2.61) 
4.93 
(3.33) 
H L H 4.47 
(3.04) 
2.35 
(2.57) 
2.62 
(2.44) 
4.00 
(2.89) 
H L L 3.52 
(2.80) 
1.88 
(2.28) 
2.50 
(2.12) 
3.43 
(2.78) 
L H H 5.29 
(2.61) 
2.64 
(2.93) 
3.50 
(2.94) 
3.37 
(3.03) 
L H L 3.76 
(2.90) 
1.94 
(2.60) 
2.43 
(2.65) 
2.87 
(3.16) 
L L H 3.88 
(2.67) 
1.47 
(2.18) 
2.00 
(2.19) 
3.06 
(3.08) 
L L L 3.05 
(2.70) 
.64 
(1.83) 
1.18 
(1.90) 
2.06 
(2.59) 
Between Group Means 4.47 2.43 2.78 3.71 
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Table 4.19 
Analysis of Variance for Reliance Judgments 
Source of Variation D.F. M.S. F P 
Main Effects 
Inherent Risk (IR) 1 11.530 .45 .503 
Control Strength (CS) 1 5.190 .20 .653 
Objectvity (0) 1 227.260 42.81 .001 
Competence (C) 1 274.350 53.86 .001 
Work (W) 1 113.930 37.28 .001 
Two Way Interactions 
IR X CS 1 11.390 .45 .506 
0 X IR 1 .650 .12 .728 
0 X CS 1 14.100 2.66 .108 
C X IR 1 3.100 .61 .438 
C X CS 1 .020 .00 .954 
0 X C 1 19.49 9.73 .003 
W X IR 1 .800 .26 .611 
W X CS 1 3.86 1.26 .265 
0 X W 1 .070 .06 .802 
C X W 1 7.260 3.01 .088 
Three Way Interactions 
0 X IR X CS 1 .210 .04 .842 
C X IR X CS 1 1.950 .38 .539 
0 X C X IR 1 .540 .27 .605 
0 X C X CS 1 2.880 1.44 .235 
W X IR X CS 1 1.340 .44 .510 
0 X W X IR 1 .030 .03 .870 
0 X W X CS 1 .060 .06 .810 
C X W X IR 1 .010 .00 .953 
C X W X CS 1 4.790 1.98 .164 
0 X C X w 1 4.880 5.76 .019 
Four Way Interactions 
0 X C X IR X CS 1 2.080 1.04 .312 
0 X W X IR X CS 1 .260 .26 .614 
C X W X IR X CS 1 .170 .07 .791 
0 X C X W X IR 1 1.230 1.46 .232 
0 X C X W X CS 1 .010 .01 .939 
Five Way Interaction 
OXCXW X IR X CS 1 .270 .32 .574 
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not support hypotheses 1 through 6c. As was mentioned 
previously, these results could be due to the limited range 
of the planned reliance scale. An auditor's planned reliance 
judgment may not change from one internal audit function 
to another however, the number of hours the auditor budgets 
may change significantly. It is also possible that auditors 
may differ in their interpretations and use of the planned 
reliance judgment. For example, auditors may disagree on 
the extent of planned reliance to assign in a particular 
audit situation but may agree upon how many hours of work to 
budget. Thus, the relative variability of the planned 
reliance judgments may be higher than that of the audit 
hours variable. 
Internal Auditors as Assistants 
The number of hours of audit work assigned to the 
internal audit functions were analyzed in order to examine 
the extent to which auditors use internal auditors as 
assistants. Because the number of hours assigned to the 
internal auditors is a function of the total number of 
hours of work that must be performed, percentage scores 
were calculated. The number of hours assigned to each 
internal audit function was divided by the total number of 
hours budgeted in each respective case. Descriptive 
statistics for the percentage scores are presented in Table 
4.20. The analysis was conducted using the multivariate 
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Table 4.20 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Percentage of Hours 
Assigned to Internal Auditors 
INHERENT RISK 
High low 
IA 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
VARIABLES Strong Weak Strong Weak 
OBJ COMP WP 
H H H .577 
(.238) 
.491 
(.274) 
.526 
(.232) 
.501 
(.297) 
H H L .487 
(.227) 
.384 
(.242) 
.422 
( .232) 
.479 
(.224) 
H L H .302 
(.199) 
.277 
( .212) 
.294 
( .251) 
.281 
(.249) 
H L L .211 
(.196) 
.225 
( .212) 
.262 
(.190) 
.258 
(.223) 
L H H .397 
(.191) 
.291 
( .264) 
.395 
(.239) 
.325 
(.297) 
L H L .380 
(.220) 
.266 
(.243) 
.340 
( .237) 
.273 
(.250) 
L L H .195 
( .162) 
.166 
(.176) 
.190 
( .183) 
.197 
( .277) 
L L L .186 
(.168) 
.129 
(.148) 
.142 
(.182) 
.162 
(.205) 
Between Group Means .342 .279 .321 .310 
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analysis of variance (MANOVA) program in SPSS and a full 
factorial model was specified. In the analysis, the 
percentage scores were employed as the dependent variables, 
inherent risk and control design strength were employed as 
the between subject variables, and internal audit 
objectivity, competence and work were employed as within 
subject variables. The results are shown in Table 4.21. 
An examination of Table 4.21 indicates that the main 
effects of the within subject variables, objectivity, 
competence, and work performed, are significant at the 
p<.001 level. They also indicate that the interactions 
between objectivity and competence, and objectivity and 
work performed are significant at the p=.035 and p=.038 
levels, respectively. More importantly, the results show 
that the three way interaction between objectivity, work 
performed and inherent risk is significant at the p=.028 
level. The significance of this interaction suggests that 
inherent risk does affect auditors' decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants, depending upon the 
objectivity and work performed of the internal auditors. 
Given the significance of the three way interaction 
term, it was not meaningful to investigate the significant 
main effect and lower order interaction terms. Therefore, 
in order to further examine the effect of inherent risk on 
auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as assistants, 
the next step in the analysis involved an indepth 
examination of the three way interaction term. The results 
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Table 4.21 
Analysis of Variance for Percentage of Hours Assigned 
Source of Variation D.F. M.S. F P 
Main Effects 
Inherent Risk (IR) 1 .003 .01 .907 
Control Strength (CS) 1 .186 1.71 .403 
Objectvity (0) 1 .196 65.45 .001 
Competence (C) 1 .480 88.40 .001 
Work (W) 1 .327 18.77 .001 
Two Way Interactions 
IR X CS 1 .087 .33 .567 
0 X IR 1 .001 .05 .819 
0 X CS 1 .028 .94 .335 
C X IR 1 .006 .11 .740 
C X CS 1 .093 1.72 .194 
0 X C 1 .106 4.61 .035 
W X IR 1 .001 .10 .754 
W X CS 1 .004 .28 .598 
0 X W 1 .030 4.48 .038 
C X W 1 .010 1.25 .267 
Three Way Interactions 
0 X IR X CS 1 .000 .00 .949 
C X IR X CS 1 .019 .37 .547 
0 X C X IR 1 .002 .13 .723 
0 X C X CS 1 .014 .64 .426 
W X IR X CS 1 .008 .46 .500 
0 X W X IR 1 .034 5.06 .028 
0 X W X CS 1 .009 1.37 .246 
C X W X IR 1 .001 .13 .723 
C X W X CS 1 .000 .03 .858 
0 X C X w 1 .005 .95 .334 
Four Way Interactions 
0 X C X IR X CS 1 .034 1.48 .228 
0 X W X IR X CS 1 .000 .02 .892 
C X W X IR X CS 1 .005 .59 .446 
0 X C X W X IR 1 .000 .01 .919 
0 X C X W X CS 1 .000 .01 .928 
Five Way Interaction 
OXCXWXIRX CS 1 .013 2.24 .139 
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of these analyses were then used to test the hypotheses 
relating to auditors' decisions in this area. 
Prior to examining this interaction, it is important 
to note there was a concern that the number of audit hours 
assigned to the internal auditors might be affected by the 
number of audit hours budgeted by the auditors. As a 
result, a step-down analysis was performed on the 
percentage of audit hours assigned to the internal auditors 
where the total number of budgeted hours of work was 
entered as the first explanatory variable, followed by the 
entry of the remaining variables; inherent risk, control 
strength, objectivity, competence and work performed. The 
results of this analysis were not different from those 
found in the original analysis. 
Examination of Three Way Interaction 
This section contains an indepth examination of the 
interaction between inherent risk, objectivity, and work 
performed. Multiple comparisons were used to perform this 
analysis. Given that a multivariate approach was used in 
the overall analysis, the Roy & Bose procedure was again 
used to conduct the multiple comparisons. In this case, a 
critical F value was determined so that multiple 
comparisons could be performed using any combination of the 
means contained in Table 4.20. The overall error rate was 
set at cx=.05. In order to identify meaningful comparisons, 
the means of each of the four combinations of the 
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objectivity and work performed variables within each 
inherent risk condition were tabulated. They are presented 
in Table 4.22. The first set of comparisons involved 
comparing each of the four internal audit descriptions 
across inherent risk levels. The results of these 
comparisons are presented in Table 4.23. The results show 
that none of the four internal audit functions were 
assigned a significantly different amount of work across 
inherent risk conditions. 
The next set of comparisons were made within each of 
the inherent risk conditions. Table 4.24 contains the 
results of comparisons that were performed between the four 
internal audit functions described in Table 4.22, within 
each of the inherent risk conditions. The results show 
that in the high inherent risk condition, the comparison 
between the low objectivity/high work performed internal 
audit function and the low objectivity/low work performed 
internal audit function is not significant. All of the 
other comparisons are either significant or are approaching 
significance. In the low inherent risk condition, no 
significant differences were found between the amount of 
work assigned to the high objectivity/high work performed 
internal auditors, and the high objectivity/low work 
performed internal auditors. Similarly, no significant 
differences were found between the amount of work assigned 
to and the low objectivity/high work performed internal 
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Table 4.22 
Cell Means of Percentage Hours Assigned for 
Three Way Interaction 
INHERENT RISK 
VARIABLES High Low 
OBJ WP 
H H .412 .401 
H L .327 .357 
L H .262 .277 
L L .240 .230 
Between Group Means .310 .316 
Table 4.23 
Comparisons Between High and Lowt Inherent Risk 
OBJ WP F 
H H (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .03 
H L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) - .74 
L H (HIGH IR ~ LOW IR) .97 
L L (HIGH IR - LOW IR) .19 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for cx=.05, 
where s=3, m=2, and n=27. 
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Table 4.24 
Comparisons Between I.A. Functions Within 
Inherent Risk Conditions 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
COMPARISON 
a 
H H - L L 
F F 
18.50 * 1.28 
H H - L H 5.37 1.91 
H H - H L 34.85 * 34.65 * 
H L - L H 7.25 * 10.11 * 
H L - L L 16.15 * 32.25 * 
L H - L L 1.53 6.57 * 
a 
The first letter designates the level of objectivity and 
the second designates the level of work performed. For 
example, H H - L L indicates a comparison between the 
High objectivity/High work performed internal audit 
function and the Low objectivity/Low work performed 
internal audit function. 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for <x=.05, 
where s=3, m=2, and n=27. 
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auditors and the high objectivity/high work performed 
internal auditors. All of the remaining comparisons were 
found to be significant. The differences in these results 
suggest that objectivity and work performed may affect 
auditors' decisions differently, depending upon the level of 
inherent risk. Thus, comparisons were made to examine the 
effects of these variables within each respective inherent 
risk condition. The results of these comparisons are shown 
in Table 4.25. They show that the objectivity and work 
* 
performed main effects are significant in both inherent risk 
conditions. However, the objectivity by work performed 
interaction is highly significant in the high inherent risk 
condition (F=9.81) but not at all significant in the low 
inherent risk situation (F=.01) This suggests that auditors 
may be using a more complex decision process to make 
decisions concerning the use of internal auditors as 
assistants in high versus low inherent risk conditions. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Recall, that H7 hypothesizes that inherent risk will 
affect auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as 
assistants. H8a hypothesizes that inherent risk will 
interact with objectivity in affecting such judgments, H8b 
addresses the interaction between inherent risk and 
competence, and H8c asserts that inherent risk will 
interact with work performed in affecting auditor judgments 
in this area. Given the significance of the three way 
112 
Table 4.25 
Comparisons Examining Effects of Objectivity and Work 
Performed Within Inherent Risk Conditions 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
F F 
COMPARISON - - 
Main Effects: 
Objectivity 32.37 * 34.18 * 
Work Performed 11.36 * 7.99 * 
Interactions: 
Obj xWp 9.81* .01 
* Significant at critical value established using Roy & 
Bose procedure. The critical F value = 5.51 for os=.05, 
where s = 3 , m=2, and n=27. 
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interaction between inherent risk, objectivity and work 
performed, it is difficult to perform direct tests of these 
main effect and lower order interaction hypotheses. 
However, meaningful conclusions can be drawn from analyzing 
the relationships expressed within them. For example, the 
fact that inherent risk is involved in the significant 
three way interaction term indicates that inherent risk 
interacts with both of these variables. Lastly, the fact 
that competence is not involved in the interaction term 
indicates that inherent risk does not interact with this 
factor in affecting auditors decisions to use internal 
auditors as assistants. 
It is also important to note that the results of the 
comparisons in Table 4.23 indicate that auditors are not 
more reluctant to use internal auditors as assistants in 
high inherent risk settings versus low risk settings. In 
addition, the fact that work performed and the work 
performed by objectivity interaction are both more 
significant in the high inherent risk condition than in the 
low risk condition indicates that auditors consider these 
factors to be more important when inherent risk is high 
versus when it is low. This is somewhat consistent with 
the multiplicative relationship expressed within the audit 
risk model. 
114 
Summary of Results Concerning Use of Internal Auditors as 
Assistants 
The results of these analyses indicate that the 
interaction between inherent risk and internal audit 
objectivity and work performed significantly affects the 
extent to which auditors use internal auditors as 
assistants. Specifically, the results suggest that 
inherent risk impacts the way in which objectivity and work 
performed affect auditors' decisions to use internal 
auditors as assistants. When inherent risk is low, 
auditors' decisions appear to be affected by the additive 
affects of objectivity and work performed. However, when 
inherent risk is high, the interaction between objectivity 
and work performed appears to significantly impact 
auditors' decisons to use internal auditors as assistants. 
The results also indicate that across all conditions, 
auditors will assign more work to highly competent internal 
auditors than they will to internal auditors with a low 
level of competence. 
The Relative Importance of The Three SAS No. 9_ Variables 
Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit Functions 
The purpose of this section was to determine whether 
the relative importance of the three SAS No. 9 factors, 
objectivity, competence, and work performed were consistent 
across inherent risk/control strength conditions for 
auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. This was 
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accomplished by performing a series of multiple comparisons 
using the percentage difference scores related to auditors' 
audit hour planning decisions. Specifically, separate 
comparisons were performed examining the effect of each of 
the SAS No. 9 variables within each inherent risk/control 
strength condition. The relative importance of each of the 
variables was determined based upon the level of 
significance of the comparison set up to test that factor. 
For each inherent risk/control strength condition, the 
effect with the highest F-statistic was determined to be 
the most important. Omega squared statistics (see Hays 1981 
pp. 365-366) were not used for this analysis because the 
three SAS No. 9 factors were set up as within subject 
variables. Therefore, significance tests associated with 
each of these variables are determined using different 
error terms. As a result, the use of omega squared 
statistics for determining the relative importance of these 
variables could result in a variable explaining the largest 
percentage of the total variance within a treatment group 
while, being less significant than another variable which 
explains a smaller percentage of the total variance. Table 
4.26 contains the results of the comparisons that were made 
within each treatment group. An examination of the results 
reveals that the relative importance of the three internal 
audit variables appears to be different across treatment 
conditions. The results show that in the high inherent 
risk/strong control condition, objectivity has a slightly 
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Table 4.26 
Comparisons Examining Relative Importance of Internal Audit 
Variables For Percentage Difference Scores 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
COMPARISONS 
F F F F 
Main Effects: 
Objectivity (Obj) 6.48 5.82 .34 4.88 
Competence (Comp) 6.05 4.19 7.01 2.52 
Work Performed (WP) 4.99 .70 .08 7.87 
Interactions: 
Obj x Comp 1.42 .00 .76 4.52 
Obj x WP 3.20 .35 .27 8.50 
Comp x WP .28 .01 .16 .00 
Obj x Comp x WP 1.04 1.07 .00 .03 
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higher F-value than competence, with work performed having 
the third highest level of significance. In the high 
inherent risk/weak control condition, objectivity again has 
a higher F-value than competence. Work performed appears 
to be of little, if any, importance in this treatment 
condition. In the low inherent risk/strong control 
condition, the most important variable, without question, 
is competence. All of the other variables have much lower 
F-statistics and appear to be of very little importance. 
The most interesting findings occur in the low inherent 
risk/weak control condition. In this treatment condition 
the objectivity by work performed interaction appears to be 
the most important effect. Work performed has the second 
highest level of significance followed by objectivity and 
the objectivity by competence interaction. In summary, 
these results indicate that auditors do not consider one of 
the three internal audit variables to be most important 
across all audit situations. Instead, they indicate that 
the factor or combination of factors considered to be most 
important is dependent upon the level of inherent risk and 
the strength of the internal controls. In particular, when 
inherent risk is low and internal controls are weak, 
auditors may employ a more complex decision process to 
determine reliance on the internal audit function. These 
results may help to explain one of the reasons why the 
results of studies addressing the relative importance of 
the three SAS No. 9 factors have not been consistent. It 
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is possible that the audit settings used in the previous 
studies differ in terms of inherent risk and control 
strength. 
Auditors1 Decisions to Use Internal Auditors As Assistants 
The relative importance of the three SAS No. 9 factors 
was also examined with respect to auditors' decisions to 
use internal auditors as assistants. The same procedure 
described in the previous section was used to determine the 
importance of each of the variables. The percentage of 
total hours of audit work assigned to the internal auditors 
was the variable examined in the analysis. The results are 
presented in Table 4.27. An examination of the results 
reveals that for auditors' decisions to use internal 
auditors as assistants, the relative importance of the 
three internal audit variables appears to be different 
across treatment conditions. In the high inherent 
risk/strong control condition, competence has the highest 
F-value, followed by objectivity. Interestingly, the 
objectivity by work performed interaction has the third 
highest level of significance in this treatment group. In 
the high inherent risk/weak control condition, the relative 
importance of the factors is quite different. In this 
treatment condition, objectivity has a somewhat higher F- 
value than competence and thus is considered to be slightly 
more important. Work performed has the third highest F- 
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Table 4.27 
Comparisons Examining Relative Importance of Internal Audit 
Variables For Percentage of Audit Hours Assigned to the 
Internal Auditors 
INHERENT RISK 
High Low 
CONTROL STRENGTH CONTROL STRENGTH 
Strong Weak Strong Weak 
COMPARISONS 
F F F F 
Main Effects: 
Objectivity (Obj) 12.53 19.94 12.31 21.23 
Competence (Comp) 35.05 15.79 23.24 16.99 
Work Performed (WP) 5.20 5.93 6.58 1.90 
Interactions: 
Obj x Comp 2.20 1.13 .01 3.52 
Obj x WP 7.54 2.85 .33 .51 
Comp x WP .01 .47 1.41 .06 
Obj x Comp x WP .03 1.57 1.48 .12 
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value. In the low inherent risk/strong control condition 
the most important variable appears to be competence. 
Objectivity and work performed appear to be the second and 
third most important variables, respectively. Finally, in 
the low inherent risk/weak control condition objectivity 
appears to be the most important variable, followed by 
objectivity, and the objectivity by competence interaction. 
In summary, when control strength is strong, 
competence appears to be the most important variable with 
objectivity being the second most important factor. 
However, when control strength is weak, the relative 
importance of these two variables appears to be reversed. 
Objectivity appears to be the most important variable with 
competence being the second most important factor. These 
results indicate that in making decisions to use internal 
auditors as assistants, auditors do not consider one of the 
three internal audit variables to be most important across 
all audit situations. Instead, the results indicate that 
the relative importance of the three factors is dependent 
upon the level of inherent risk and the strength of the 
internal controls. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter contains a brief summary of the study 
followed by a discussion of the conclusions, limitations 
and directions for future research. The overall objective 
was to examine the effect of inherent risk and control 
design strength on auditors' decisions to rely on internal 
audit functions and their decisions to use internal 
auditors as assistants. It also examined the interactions 
between these variables and the three variables suggested 
by SAS No. 9, internal audit objectivity, competence and 
work performed. The study employed a split plot analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) design. Factors associated with 
inherent risk and control design strength were manipulated 
as between subject variables and factors associated with 
the competence, objectivity, and work of the internal audit 
function were manipulated as within subject variables. 
Auditors were randomly assigned to one between factor group 
and were required to make several audit planning decisions 
for a series of audit cases in which factors associated 
with the internal audit function were manipulated. Sixty- 
seven usable responses were obtained from managers 
representing the firm of Peat, Marwick, Main & Co. 
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Auditors Decisions to Rely on Internal Auditors 
The major conclusion drawn from the first part of the 
study is that auditors' internal audit reliance decisions 
are not, as indicated by SAS No. 9, merely a function of 
the objectivity, competence, and work performed of the 
internal audit function. Instead, this study suggests that 
inherent risk and control strength also affect auditors1 
internal audit reliance decisions. Specifically, the 
extent to which auditors rely on internal audit functions 
appears to be dependent upon the four way interaction 
between inherent risk, control design strength, 
objectivity and work performed, and upon the four way 
interaction between inherent risk, control design strength, 
objectivity and competence. Comparisons performed to 
investigate these interaction terms indicate that in high 
inherent risk situations auditors rely more on internal 
auditors in strong control conditions than in weak control 
conditions. However, in low inherent risk conditions, 
auditors do not appear to rely more on internal auditors 
when controls are strong than when controls are weak. 
The study also indicates that inherent risk and 
control strength impact the extent and nature of the effect 
of objectivity, competence and work performed on auditors' 
reliance decisions. In high inherent risk/strong control 
conditions, the extent to which auditors rely on internal 
auditors in strong control conditions is significantly 
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dependent upon the objectivity and competence of the 
internal auditors and to some extent upon their work 
performed. However, when inherent risk is high and 
controls are weak, auditors' reliance decisions appear to 
be significantly affected by the objectivity of the 
internal auditrs and to a lesser extent by their 
competence. In low inherent risk/strong control 
conditions, only competence significantly affects auditors' 
decisions. Both objectivity and work performed are 
insignificant. However, in low inherent risk/weak control 
conditions, auditors' decisions to rely on internal audit 
functions appear to be significantly dependent upon the 
work performed by the internal auditors and the interaction 
between internal audit objectivity and work performed. The 
significance of the interaction between objectivity and 
work performed within this treatment condition, as well as 
the fact that the objectivity by competence interaction 
approaches significance, indicates that when making 
internal audit reliance decisions in low inherent risk/weak 
control conditions, auditors may use a more complex 
decision process than they use in other inherent 
risk/control strength situations. 
The fact that inherent risk and control strength 
impact auditors' decisions to rely on internal auditors by 
interacting with the three SAS No. 9 factors is of primary 
importance. The role of inherent risk and control strength 
in auditors' internal audit reliance decisions is not 
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directly addressed in any official auditing pronouncement. 
Therefore, there is little, if any, guidance with respect 
to how, and to what extent, auditors should consider these 
variables in making internal audit reliance decisions. It 
is possible that each individual auditor has a different 
view with respect to how factors associated with inherent 
risk and control strength should affect their internal 
audit reliance decisions. It is also possible that some 
auditors are not fully aware that these variables are 
affecting their decisions in this area. As a result, this 
study indicates that further research is necessary to 
determine if these factors should be considered by auditors 
and to what extent. 
The fact that inherent risk and control strength 
significantly affects auditors' reliance decisions is also 
important given that the audit risk model suggests that 
these factors should affect such decisions. In addition, 
the finding that control strength affects auditors' 
reliance decisions more in high versus low inherent risk 
settings is particularly interesting given that these 
results are somewhat consistent with the nature of the 
effect predicted by the audit risk model and the findings 
of Libby et al. (1985). The multiplicative relationship 
expressed in the audit risk model suggests that control 
strength should affect auditors' planning decisions more in 
high inherent risk situations than in low inherent risk 
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situations. Consistent with the model, the analyses 
performed on each of the four way interaction terms 
revealed that in the high inherent risk condition, auditors 
relied more on internal auditors in strong control 
conditions than they did in weak control conditions yet, in 
the low inherent risk condition there is no significant 
difference between the reliance placed on auditors in the 
strong versus the weak control condition. Thus, control 
strength appears to have a greater affect on auditors' 
internal audit reliance decisions in high versus low 
inherent risk settings. In contrast, the interactions 
between inherent risk and the three SAS No. 9 factors 
provide mixed results concerning the audit risk model. The 
results of this study reveal that in strong control 
conditions, the objectivity and work performed factors are 
more significant when inherent risk is high than when it is 
low (F=6.48 versus .35 for objectivity, and F=4.99 versus 
.08 for work performed.) This is consistent with the 
multiplicative relationship implied by the audit risk 
model. However, when controls are weak, the relationship 
described in the audit risk model does not appear to hold 
true as the work performed, objectivity by competence and 
objectivity by work performed factors are more significant 
when inherent risk is low versus when it is high (F=7.87 
versus .70 for work performed, F= 4.52 versus .42 for the 
objectivity by competence interaction, and F=8.50 versus 
.35 for the objectivity by work performed interaction.) 
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These results indicate that the effect of inherent risk and 
control strength on auditors' reliance decisions is even 
more complex than that described by the audit risk model. 
They suggest that the extent and nature of the effect of 
internal audit objectivity, competence and work performed 
on auditors' internal audit reliance decisions is contingent 
upon the strength of the controls that exist in the area 
being audited which, is contingent upon the level of 
inherent risk. 
Finally, the fact that the results of this study 
indicate that inherent risk, control strength and the three 
SAS No. 9 factors affect auditors' internal audit reliance 
decisions through complex four way interactions is of major 
importance for several reasons. First, these interactions 
indicate that auditors' internal audit reliance decisions 
are more complex than previously indicated in the studies 
of Brown (1983), Schneider (1983 and 1985), Abdel-khalik et 
al. (1983) , and Margheim (1986) . In all of these studies, 
competence, objectivity and work performed were found to 
have simple, additive effects on auditors' reliance 
decisions. Secondly, these results are also inconsistent 
with the general findings in psychology which have 
indicated that individuals exercise relatively simple 
decision making rules (see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 
1982). Lastly, other studies in accounting have shown that 
auditors use slightly more complex decision rules than have 
been evidenced in similar psychology studies (see Ashton, 
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1982 and Libby, 1982). However, this study indicates that 
auditors exercise decisions rules that are far more complex 
than those that have been found in most previous psychology 
and accounting research. 
Auditors Decisions to Use Interna1 Auditors As Assistants 
The major conclusion drawn with respect to this 
portion of the study is that auditors' decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants are affected by the 
interaction between inherent risk and internal audit 
objectivity and work performed. In effect, the study 
indicates that inherent risk impacts the way in which 
objectivity and work performed affect auditors' decisions 
to use internal auditors as assistants. When inherent risk 
is low, auditors' decisions appear to be affected by the 
additive affects of objectivity and work performed. 
However, when inherent risk is high, objectivity and work 
performed interact in affecting auditors' decisons. This 
implies that auditors are also using a relatively complex 
decision rule to make decisions concerning the use of 
auditors as assistants. One explanation for these results 
may be that when inherent risk is high, auditors are much 
more concerned about the extent of reliance they place on 
the internal auditors. Therefore, in making decisions 
concerning the use of internal auditors as assistants, 
auditors may consider more complex relationships between 
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objectivity and work performed when inherent risk is high 
than when inherent risk is low. The findings of this study 
also indicate that across inherent risk conditions, 
auditors assign more work to highly competent internal 
auditors than they do to less competent internal auditors. 
The results concerning the interaction between 
objectivity and work performed conflict with the findings 
of Abdel-khalik et al. (1983). In their study concerning 
auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as assistants, 
they did not find a significant interaction between 
objectivity and work performed and concluded that an 
additive model best explained their data. One explanation 
could be that the setting used in the Abdel-khalik study 
contained a low level of inherent risk. However, the 
possibility also exists that differences in the way the 
variables were defined in each of the studies are 
responsible for the inconsistent results. 
In comparing the results concerning auditors' internal 
audit reliance decisions and auditors' decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants, it appears that although 
inherent risk impacts both decisions, it seeems to have a 
more dramatic affect on auditors' reliance decisions than on 
auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as assistants. 
One reason for this may be that auditors have more control 
over internal auditors when they are used as assistants 
versus when they perform work on their own. When internal 
auditors are used as assistants, auditors can supervise the 
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work of the internal auditors. However, when internal 
auditors perform work in the absense of the auditor, a much 
greater risk exists with respect to the quality and 
reliability of that work. Therefore, auditors may be less 
sensitive to inherent risk when making decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants, than when deciding to 
reduce audit testing by relying on the auditors work. 
The Relative Importance of the Three SAS No. 9 Factors 
Auditors1 Reliance Decisions 
The major finding of this portion of the study is that 
auditors do not consider one of the three internal audit 
variables to be most important across all audit situations. 
Instead, they indicate that the factor or combination of 
factors considered to be most important is dependent upon 
the level of inherent risk and the strength of the internal 
controls. The results of the study show that in the high 
inherent risk/strong control conditions, objectivity is the 
most important factor followed closely by competence. Work 
performed is considered to be the third most important 
factor in such situations. In the high inherent risk/ weak 
control condition, objectivity again is considered to be 
the most important factor followed by competence. Work 
performed appears to be of little, if any, importance in 
this treatment condition. In the low inherent risk/strong 
control condition, the most important variable, without 
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question, is competence. All of the other variables appear 
to be of very little importance. The most interesting 
findings occur in the low inherent risk/weak control 
condition. In this treatment condition the objectivity by 
work performed interaction appears to be the most important 
effect. Work performed is the second most important 
factor, followed by objectivity and the objectivity by 
competence interaction. 
These results may help to explain one of the reasons 
why the results of studies addressing the relative 
importance of the three SAS No. 9 factors have not been 
consistent. Recall that Brown (1983) found that of the 
three factors suggested by the internal audit function, 
work performed was the most important, followed by 
objectivity. Abdel-khalik et al. (1983) found that 
objectivity was more important than work performed. 
Schneider (1984 and 1985) found that internal audit work 
performed was the most important factor followed by 
competence and work performed, respectively. In addition 
to differences in the definitions of these factors, it is 
also possible, that the inconsistencies found in the 
results of these studies are due to experimental 
differences in inherent risk and control strength. In 
effect, the decision to rely on internal auditors appears 
to be much more complex than indicated by SAS No. 9 or 
previous studies addressing this area. 
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The Importance of the Three SAS No. 9 Factors and Internal 
Auditors As Assistants 
The major finding of this portion of the study is that 
in making decisions to use internal auditors as assistants, 
auditors do not consider one of the three internal audit 
variables to be most important across all audit situations. 
Instead, the results indicate that in making such 
decisions, the relative importance of the three factors is 
also dependent upon the level of inherent risk and the 
strength of the internal controls. When control strength 
is strong, competence appears to be the most important 
variable with objectivity being the second most important 
factor. However, when control strength is weak, the 
relative importance of these two variables appears to be 
reversed, as objectivity appears to be the most important 
variable with competence being the second most important 
factor. This is true regardless of the level of inherent 
risk. One explanation for this may be that when making 
decisions to use intenal auditors as assistants, auditors 
may feel that technical competence is not very important 
when the control system is relatively unsophisticated. 
The results also indicate that work performed is less 
important than objectivity and competence across all four 
between subject groups. The reason for this may be that 
when making decisions to use internal auditors as 
assistants, auditors are not as concerned about what 
auditors have done as they are about what they are capable 
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of doing. Work performed may only be important from the 
perspective that it provides some indication of the 
competence of the internal auditors. 
In the only study which has investigated the use of 
internal auditors as assistants, Abdel-khalik et al. (1983) 
found that internal audit objectivity was more important 
than work performed. The results of this study do not 
conflict with their findings. However, it is difficult to 
make indepth comparisons between the studies given that the 
Abdel-khalik et al. study did not examine internal audit 
competence. 
A comparison of the results between auditors' internal 
audit reliance decisions and auditors' decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants reveals some noteable 
similarities and differences with respect to the relative 
importance of the three SAS No. 9 variables. First, for 
both of the internal audit decisions, inherent risk and 
control strength appear to affect the relative importance 
of the three factors. Similarly, for both decisions 
competence is more significant when controls are strong 
than when controls are weak, regardless of the level of 
inherent risk. However, in making decisions to use 
internal auditors as assistants, competence is significant 
across all four treatment conditions and is the first or 
second most important factor in each treatment group. Yet, 
in making decisions to rely on internal auditors competence 
is ranked as the most import factor only when inherent risk 
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is low and controls are strong. Also, in the low inherent 
risk/strong control condition, objectivity and work 
performed are not very important in auditors' reliance 
decisions but are much more important in auditors' 
decisions to use internal auditors as assistants. Finally, 
auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as assistants 
appear to be the most complex when inherent risk is high 
and controls are weak. However, for auditors' internal 
audit reliance decisions, low inherent risk and weak 
controls appear to yield the most complex decision rule. 
Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations to this study. First, 
although the case materials were designed with the 
assistance of practicing auditors and every attempt was 
made to ensure the realism of the case information, the 
experiment still used a simplified task setting. In an 
actual audit engagement the auditor is faced with the task 
of extracting and assimilating information from a very 
complex environment while being faced with a multitude of 
time pressures. In this study the subjects were only asked 
to make decisions concerning one very small part of the 
overall audit process and were given no real time 
constraints. 
A further limitation of the study involves the use of 
within subject manipulations. With such a design the 
134 
possibility exists that the subjects are being sensitized 
to the within subject variables. Also, given that only one 
audit setting was used in the experiment, along with 
participants from only one accounting firm, the 
generalizabi1ity of the results of this study are somewhat 
limited. As always, the validity of the results are 
dependent upon how accurately each of the variables used in 
the study have been defined. To the extent that they do 
not capture the factors examined in the study, the validity 
of the results can be questioned. However, in this study 
extensive pretesting was performed in an effort to minimize 
this concern. 
Directions for Future Research 
The results of this study indicate that any research 
addressing auditors' decisions concerning internal audit 
functions should address the effects of inherent risk and 
control strength, as well as the effect of the three SAS 
No. 9 factors. Therefore, further research is necessary to 
obtain a better understanding of how these variables are 
affecting auditors' decisions concerning internal auditors. 
At the same time, additional research is necessary to 
determine if these factors should be affecting such 
decisions, and if so, in what manner and to what extent. 
This study examines the effects of inherent risk and 
control strength in one specific audit setting. Further 
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research is necessary to determine if these factors affect 
auditors' decisions differently in other audit task 
settings. Also, this study manipulated the three SAS No. 9 
factors using a within subject design. It would be 
interesting to see if an examination of these issues using 
a complete between subject design would yield similar 
results. In addition, this study manipulated each factor 
using only two levels. It is possible that valuable 
information could be obtained by using a more detailed 
breakdown of each factor. It would also be valuable to 
model the judgments of individual auditors to determine if 
the process by which individuals consider these factors are 
as complex as those found at the aggregate level. 
Implications of the Results in Practice 
The results concerning auditors' decisions to rely on 
internal audit functions to reduce audit testing have 
implications for both auditors and internal auditors. 
First, given the ever increasing costs related to the 
independent audit, the results of this study have 
implications concerning how the internal audit functions 
can best be used to reduce audit fees. For example, the 
results of the study indicate that management can best 
utilize the internal audit function by directing their 
efforts toward high inherent risk areas that have 
relatively strong controls. The study also provides 
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information concerning how companies can best utilize their 
internal audit functions. For example, the results imply 
that if the internal auditors are of relatively poor 
quality, they might be more efficiently used in a situation 
other than one which contains high inherent risk and weak 
controls. The results of the study also imply that in 
terms of reducing audit fees, there is a limit to the 
benefit of performing comprehensive audit procedures in 
certain situations. Specifically, in situations where 
inherent risk is high and controls are weak, and in 
situations where inherent risk is low and controls are 
strong, work performed does not appear to significantly 
affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. Also, 
the results seem to imply that internal auditors might be 
better off working to improve controls in high risk 
environments, instead of spending time auditing 
questionable controls. 
In terms of the external auditor, the results of this 
study provide further evidence concerning the way in which 
SAS No. 9 is or is not being implimented. The results 
indicate that auditors are considering variables, inherent 
risk and control strength, that are not mentioned in SAS 
No. 9. They also indicate that auditors do not consider 
those factors that are mentioned, objectivity, competence, 
and work performed, across all audit situations. Thus, it 
seems that auditors decisions concerning internal auditors 
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are not as simple as indicated by SAS No. 9 which, suggests 
that a closer look at the statement may be in order. 
The results of this study also seem to imply that 
communication between internal auditors and external 
auditors could help to make internal auditors more 
efficient. Auditors need to determine what work internal 
auditors should do and in what situations. Auditors then 
need to communicate this information to the internal 
auditors. As business systems become increasingly more 
complex, the benefits of such an effort will become even 
greater. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. "Auditors" hereafter refers to external auditors unless 
otherwise stated. 
2. Hereafter "auditor reliance on the internal audit 
function" refers to the effect of the internal audit 
function on the extent of audit testing performed in an 
audit area. 
3. "Test strength" and "test results" were not 
hypothesized to affect auditors decisions concerning 
internal auditors because such decisions are generally made 
prior to audit testing. 
4. Control strength was not hypothesized to affect 
auditors' decisions to use internal auditors as assistants 
because discussions with practicing auditors revealed that 
the strength of the internal control system would not have 
an effect on such decisions. 
5. A cycle is an aggregation of a series of individual 
accounting processes that are related to a specific type of 
transaction data which is processed to produce changes in a 
set of general ledger accounts (i.e., sales and receivables 
cycle) . 
6. This does not mean to suggest that auditors formally 
make reliance judgments at the process level. Instead, 
the suggestion is that auditors informally make such 
judgments and then combine them with similiar judgments 
concerning related processes in order to make reliance 
decisions at the cycle level. 
7. The pretest was designed in this manner so that it would 
be consistent with the construction of the final instrument 
in which subjects would receive one level of each between 
subject variable and all levels of each within subject 
variable. 
8. The mean number of audit hours assigned in the "no 
internal audit function" case was 72.4 for the high 
inherent risk/strong control condition, 66.3 for the high 
inherent risk/weak control condition, 51.7 for the low 
inherent risk/strong control condition, and 41.9 for the 
low inherent risk/weak control condition. The reason the 
mean number of hours assigned in the strong control 
conditions is greater than the number assigned in the weak 
control conditions is probably because the controls in the 
strong control conditions are also more complex and thus 
may take longer to compliance test. 
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9. MANOVA was used to analyze the data because it has 
fewer restrictions concerning the variance-covariance 
structure of the within subject variables than is assumed 
in the ANOVA approach to analyzing within subject designs. 
10. Even though this interaction was only significant at 
the p=.081 level it was thought that an examination of the 
nature of this interaction would provide valuable insights 
into auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. 
11. The mean planned reliance response in the "no internal 
audit function" case was 2.41 for the high inherent 
risk/strong control condition, .47 for the high inherent 
risk/weak control condition, 1.31 for the low inherent 
risk/strong control condition, and 1.75 for the low 
inherent risk/weak control condition. 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE MANIPULATIONS AND FINAL 
INSTRUMENT 
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Exhibit Is Instructions for Final Instrument 
Instructions: 
For the purpose of this exercise please assume that 
you are auditing the sales and receivables cycle of ABC 
Company. Specifically, assume you are involved in 
examining the collectibility of ABC Company1s receivables. 
A brief desciption of your client, the process your client 
uses to authorize credit sales and your client's internal 
audit function are attached. After reading this 
information you will be asked to make three different 
audit planning decisions related to auditing the 
collectibility of ABC Company's receivables. You will 
then be asked to make the same audit planning decisions 
assuming that a different internal audit function exists 
at ABC Company. You will be asked to make these decisions 
for several different internal audit descriptions. Please 
read each description carefully and consider them 
independently of one another. You may refer back to the 
unchanging company and control system information as often 
as you wish. 
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Exhibit 2: High Inherent Risk Manipulation 
ABC Company is a manufacturer of equipment and 
supplies that are used by companies in the oil extraction 
and exploration industry. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. Similar to previous 
years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that most of the company's credit sales have 
been made to domestic oil companies. However, because of 
the problems the oil industry has incurred during the past 
year (oil prices at a 10 year low), many oil companies are 
undergoing serious economic difficulties and therefore may 
be poor credit risks. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has gross receivables of $17 million. The balance in the 
allowance for doubtful accounts is $810,000. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
This year, the audit of ABC Co. must be completed within 5 
weeks of their fiscal year end. 
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Exhibit 3: Low Inherent Risk Manipulation 
ABC Company is a manufacturer and distributor of 
medical equipment and supplies. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. During those audits, no 
major problems were found with respect to the 
collectibility of accounts receivable. Similar to 
previous years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that the most of the company's sales have been 
made on a credit basis to hospitals and large medical 
facilities in the U.S. Historically, hospitals and large 
medical institutions have had a low risk of default and, 
therefore, are considered good credit risks. In the past 
year, no major changes have occurred with respect to ABC's 
internal or external business environment. Co. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has gross receivables of $17 million. The balance in the 
allowance for doubtful accounts is $810,000. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
This year, the audit of ABC Co. must be completed within 5 
weeks of their fiscal year end. 
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Exhibit 4: Weak Control Design Strength Manipulation 
The Credit Approval Process: 
ABC Company's credit approval process is a component 
of the company's on-line sales processing system. Once a 
customer order is entered into the system, the credit 
approval process automatically begins. 
If the order is from a new customer, the system 
checks the customer credit reference file to see if two 
credit references are available for the customer. The 
credit references are obtained from two of the customer's 
vendors. The reference form asks the vendor to provide 
standard credit information concerning the customer. The 
sales person responsible for acquiring the order is 
responsible for obtaining the credit references. All 
credit references are reviewed and initialed by one of the 
company's credit managers. Once initialed, the credit 
reference information is entered into the system. If the 
credit references are available for a new customer, then 
the order is automatically processed by the system. If 
the credit references are not available for a new 
customer, the order is automatically placed into a 
suspense file and the sales person responsible for the 
order is notified. 
If the order is from a repeat customer, the system 
checks to see if the customer has any oustanding 
receivables with ABC Company. This is done by accessing 
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the customer's receivable record in ABC's accounts 
receivable file. This record contains information 
concerning the amount and age of all outstanding 
receivables belonging to the customer. 
If the record shows that the customer has any 
receivables that are 90 days or more past due, the order 
is rejected. Rejection of an order causes the system to 
place the customer's order into a suspense file and to 
generate a customer rejection notice for mailing. If the 
customer's record shows that there are no receivables that 
are 90 days or more past due, then the credit sale is 
automatically processed. 
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Exhibit 5: Strong Control Design Strength Manipulation 
The Credit Approval Process: 
ABC Company's credit approval process is a component 
of the company's on-line sales processing system. Once a 
customer order is entered into the system, the credit 
approval process begins. 
If the order is from a new customer, the system 
automatically sends information concerning the customer 
and the sales order to ABC's credit department. Upon 
receipt of this information, the credit department obtains 
a list of the customer's vendors and the name of the 
customer's primary banking institution. The department 
contacts two of the customer's vendors, the customer's 
bank, and the Dunn and Bradstreet credit information 
service for the purpose of obtaining standard credit 
information about the customer. Once all of the reguired 
credit information is available on the system, the 
customer's name and order number is added to a file of 
customers ready for review. The company credit manager 
then accesses and reviews the customer's credit 
information. If the credit manager considers the customer 
to be a bad credit risk, a rejection code is entered into 
the system causing the order to be rejected and a notice 
to be sent to the customer. If the customer is considered 
a good risk, the credit manager determines an acceptable 
credit limit for the customer. If the amount of the order 
does not exceed this limit, a credit authorization number 
147 
is entered into the system which triggers processing of 
the order. However, if the amount of the order exeeds 
this credit limit, the order is held in a suspense file 
and the customer is notified. 
If the order is from a repeat customer, the system 
performs several preliminary checks prior to initiating 
the detailed review. First, the system checks to see if 
an order from the customer has been rejected within the 
past year. If so, the customer's order is not processed 
and the customer is notified. If the customer has not had 
an order rejected within the past year, then the 
customer's credit record is checked for past due 
receivables. If the customer has receivables that are 60 
days or more past due, the order is not processed and the 
customer is notified. If however, the customer's last 
credit rating was acceptable and the customer has no past 
due receivables, then the information concerning the 
customer and the order is sent to the credit department. 
If the customer had a detailed credit review performed 
within the past 30 days then only a follow-up review is 
performed. The follow-up review consists of obtaining 
information from Dunn and Bradstreet and the customer's 
bank and reassessing the credit limit. If a detailed 
credit review has not been performed within the past 30 
days, then the detailed credit check described above is 
performed. 
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Exhibit 6: Internal Audit Competence Manipulations 
High Competence: 
The internal audit department consists mainly of 
individuals without college degrees and recent college 
graduates with degrees in accounting and no previous work 
experience. The head of the department has been at ABC 
Company for 30 years and is nearing retirement. 
Low Competence: 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. consists mainly 
of former "Big Eight" auditors with at least 3 years of 
audit experience. Most of the internal auditors have been 
with ABC Co. for at least 4 years. The department head 
has been with the company for 8 years. 
Exhibit 7: Internal Audit Objectivity Manipulations 
High Objectivity: 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. reports to the 
company controller. In effect, the internal audit 
department is responsible to the company controller. 
Low Objectivity: 
The internal audit department reports to an independent 
audit committee. In effect, the internal audit department 
is responsible to the independent audit committee. 
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Exhibit 8: Work Performed Manipulations 
High Comprehensiveness: 
The internal auditors monitor the credit authorization 
process by performing detailed tests on the system. They 
perform detailed tests to determine whether the reguired 
credit information is being obtained for all customers and 
whether the decisions to grant credit to customers are 
being made consistent with company policy. The internal 
auditors report that based on their work, all credit 
authorization policies and procedures are operating as 
designed. 
Low Comprehensiveness: 
The internal auditors monitor the credit authorization 
process by periodically observing credit approval 
activities and making inquiries of credit department 
personnel. The internal auditors report that based on 
their work, all credit authorization policies and 
procedures are operating as designed. 
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Exhibit 9: Response Variables 
Planned Reliance Decision: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for ABC Company. 
0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9 
! i 
No Maximum 
Reliance Reliance 
Audit Hours Decision: 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Reliance On Internal Auditors As Assistants: 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Exhibit 10: Complete Version of the Final Instrument (high 
inherent risk/strong control strength manipulations) 
ABC Company is a manufacturer and distributor of 
medical equipment and supplies. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. During those audits, no 
major problems were found with respect to the 
collectibility of accounts receivable. Similar to 
previous years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that the most of the company's sales have been 
made on a credit basis to hospitals and large medical 
facilities in the U.S. Historically, hospitals and large 
medical institutions have had a low risk of default and, 
therefore, are considered good credit risks. In the past 
year, no major changes have occurred with respect to ABC's 
internal or external business environment. Co. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has gross receivables of $17 million. The balance in the 
allowance for doubtful accounts is $810,000. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
This year, the audit of ABC Co. must be completed within 5 
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weeks of their fiscal year end. 
The Credit Approval Process: 
ABC Company's credit approval process is a component 
of the company's on-line sales processing system. Once a 
customer order is entered into the system, the credit 
approval process begins. 
If the order is from a new customer, the system 
automatically sends information concerning the customer 
and the sales order to ABC's credit department. Upon 
receipt of this information, the credit department obtains 
a list of the customer's vendors and the name of the 
customer's primary banking institution. The department 
contacts two of the customer's vendors, the customer's 
bank, and the Dunn and Bradstreet credit information 
service for the purpose of obtaining standard credit 
information about the customer. Once all of the required 
credit information is available on the system, the 
customer's name and order number is added to a file of 
customers ready for review. The company credit manager 
then accesses and reviews the customer's credit 
information. If the credit manager considers the customer 
to be a bad credit risk, a rejection code is entered into 
the system causing the order to be rejected and a notice 
to be sent to the customer. If the customer is considered 
a good risk, the credit manager determines an acceptable 
credit limit for the customer. If the amount of the order 
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does not exceed this limit, a credit authorization number 
is entered into the system which triggers processing of 
the order. However, if the amount of the order exeeds 
this credit limit, the order is held in a suspense file 
and the customer is notified. 
If the order is from a repeat customer, the system 
performs several preliminary checks prior to initiating 
the detailed review. First, the system checks to see if 
an order from the customer has been rejected within the 
past year. If so, the customer's order is not processed 
and the customer is notified. If the customer has not had 
an order rejected within the past year, then the 
customer's credit record is checked for past due 
receivables. If the customer has receivables that are 60 
days or more past due, the order is not processed and the 
customer is notified. If however, the customer's last 
credit rating was acceptable and the customer has no past 
due receivables, then the information concerning the 
customer and the order is sent to the credit department. 
If the customer had a detailed credit review performed 
within the past 30 days then only a follow-up review is 
performed. The follow-up review consists of obtaining 
information from Dunn and Bradstreet and the customer's 
bank and reassessing the credit limit. If a detailed 
credit review has not been performed within the past 30 
days, then the detailed credit check described above is 
performed. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. reports to 
the company controller. In effect, the internal audit 
department is responsible to the company controller. The 
department consists mainly of individuals without college 
degrees and recent college graduates with degrees in 
accounting and no previous work experience. The head of 
the department has been at ABC Company for 30 years and is 
nearing retirement. The internal auditors monitor the 
credit authorization process by periodically observing 
credit approval activities and making inquiries of credit 
department personnel. The internal auditors report that 
based on their work, all credit authorization policies and 
procedures are operating as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for ABC Company. 
0.1.2.3.4.5 
i 
• 
No 
Reliance 
6.7 8.9 
i 
• 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal auditors at ABC Co. monitor the credit 
authorization process by periodically observing credit 
approval activities and making inquiries of credit 
department personnel. The internal audit department 
reports to an independent audit committee. In effect, the 
internal audit department is responsible to the 
independent audit committee. The department consists 
mainly of individuals without college degrees and recent 
college graduates with degrees in accounting and no 
previous work experience. The head of the department has 
been at ABC Co. for 30 years and is nearing retirement. 
The internal auditors report that based on their work, all 
credit authorization policies and procedures are operating 
as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for ABC Company. 
0.1.2.3 
i 
• 
No 
Reliance 
4.5.6 7.8.9 
i 
• 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. consists 
mainly of former "Big Eight" auditors with at least 3 
years of audit experience. Most of the internal auditors 
have been with ABC Co. for at least 4 years. The 
department head has been with the company for 8 years. 
The internal audit department reports to the company 
controller. Essentially, the department is responsible to 
the company controller. The internal auditors monitor the 
credit authorization process by periodically observing 
credit approval activities and making inquiries of credit 
department personnel. The internal auditors report that 
based on their work, all credit authorization policies and 
procedures are operating as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for ABC Company. 
0.1.2.3 
i 
• 
NO 
Reliance 
4.5.6 7.8.9 
i 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. consists 
mainly of former "Big Eight" auditors with at least 3 
years of audit experience. Most of the internal auditors 
have been with ABC Co. for at least 4 years. The 
department head has been with the company for 8 years. 
The internal auditors monitor the credit authorization 
process by periodically observing credit approval 
activities and making inquiries of credit department 
personnel. The internal audit department reports to an 
independent audit committee. Essentially, the department 
is responsible to the independent audit committee. The 
internal auditors report that based on their work, all 
credit authorization policies and procedures are operating 
as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for ABC Company. 
0.1.2.3.4 
i 
No 
Reliance 
8 9 
i 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. reports to 
the company controller. In effect, the internal audit 
department is responsible to the company controller. The 
department consists mainly of individuals without college 
degrees and recent college graduates with degrees in 
accounting and no previous work experience. The head of 
the department has been at ABC Co. for 30 years and is 
nearing retirement. The internal auditors monitor the 
credit authorization process by performing detailed tests 
on the system. They perform detailed tests to determine 
whether the required credit information is being obtained 
for all customers and whether the decisions to grant 
credit to customers are being made consistent with company 
policy. The internal auditors report that based on their 
work, all credit authorization policies and procedures are 
operating as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for ABC Company. 
0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9 
i ! 
No Maximum 
Reliance Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
159 
Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal auditors at ABC Co. monitor the credit 
authorization process by performing detailed tests on the 
system. They perform detailed tests to determine whether 
the required credit information is being obtained for all 
customers and whether the decisions to grant credit are 
being made consistent with company policy. The internal 
audit department at ABC Co. reports to an independent 
audit committee. In effect, the department is responsible 
to the independent audit committee. The department 
consists mainly of individuals without college degrees and 
recent college graduates with degrees in accounting and no 
previous work experience. The head of the department has 
been at ABC Co. for 30 years and is nearing retirement. 
The internal auditors report that based on their work, all 
credit authorization policies and procedures are operating 
as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for this company. 
0.1.2 
! 
• 
No 
Reliance 
3.4.5.6.7.8.9 
i 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal audit department at ABC Co. consists 
mainly of former "Big Eight" auditors with at least 3 
years of audit experience. Most of the internal auditors 
have been with ABC Co. for at least 4 years. The 
department head has been with the company for 8 years. 
The internal auditors monitor the credit authorization 
process by performing detailed tests on the system. They 
perform detailed tests to determine whether the required 
credit information is being obtained for all customers and 
whether the decisions to grant credit are being made 
consistent with company policy. The internal audit 
department reports to the company controller. 
Essentially, the department is responsible to the company 
controller. The internal auditors report that based on 
their work, all credit authorization policies and 
procedures are operating as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for this company. 
0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9 
i ! 
No Maximum 
Reliance Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that the internal audit department described 
below exists at ABC Co. 
The internal auditors at ABC Co. monitor the credit 
authorization process by performing detailed tests on the 
system. They perform detailed tests to determine whether 
the required credit information is being obtained for all 
customers and whether the decisions to grant credit are 
being made consistent with company policy. The department 
consists mainly of former "Big Eight" auditors with at 
least 3 years of audit experience. Most of the internal 
auditors have been with ABC Co. for at least 4 years. The 
department head has been with the company for 8 years. 
The internal audit department reports to an independent 
audit committee. In effect, the department is responsible 
to the independent audit committee. The internal auditors 
report that based on their work, all credit authorization 
policies and procedures are operating as designed. 
Given the information provided about ABC Co. and its 
credit approval process, and the existence of the internal 
audit department described above, please respond to the 
following: 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for this company. 
0.1.2.3.4 
i 
No 
Reliance 
8 9 
i 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of ABC Company's 
receivables. 
Based on the number you indicated above, please specify 
the number of budgeted hours of audit work you would be 
willing to assign to ABC's internal auditors. 
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Please assume that there is no internal audit department 
at ABC Company. 
Please indicate (circle) the level of planned reliance you 
would be willing to place on the controls over the credit 
approval process for this company. 
0.1.2.3.4.5 
i 
• 
NO 
Reliance 
6.7 8.9 
i 
Maximum 
Reliance 
Please indicate the total number of audit hours you would 
budget for auditing the collectibility of this company's 
receivables. 
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Demographic Information 
Firm Name: 
Current Position in Firm: (a) Partner 
(b) Manager 
(c) Senior 
Number of Years of Audit Experience: 
Please check the item below which best describes your 
experience in auditing clients with internal audit 
departments. 
(a) I have audited many clients with internal audit 
departments and have a great deal of experience 
making planning decisions in such situations. 
(b) I have audited several clients with internal 
audit departments and have a moderate amount of 
experience making planning decisions in such 
situations. 
(c) I have audited very few clients with internal 
audit departments and have very little 
experience making planning decisions in such 
situations. 
(d) I have never audited a client with an internal 
audit department. 
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APPENDIX B: PRETESTS 
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Exhibit 1: The Cover Letter for Pilot Test I 
Dear Participant, 
I am currently performing research concerning the 
effect of certain audit engagement characteristics on 
auditors' sample size decisions. As a preliminary part of 
of this research, I need to acquire auditors' opinions 
concerning certain audit engagement characteristics. I 
would like you to carefully read the information presented 
in parts I, II, and III and respond to the questions 
contained within each of the respective sections. Please 
consider each part as well as each question independently. 
Thank you very much for your assistance and cooporation. 
Sincerely, 
Mario Maletta 
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Exhibit 2: High Inherent Risk Manipulation for Pilot Test I 
Assume that you are auditing the sales and 
receivables cycle of ABC Company. Specifically, you are 
involved in examining the collectibility of your client's 
receivables. ABC Company is a manufacturer of equipment 
and supplies that are used by companies in the oil 
extraction and exploration industry. The company had 80 
million dollars in sales last year and has outstanding 
receivables of 15 million dollars. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. 
Preliminary audit work indicates that most of the 
company's credit sales have been made to domestic oil 
companies. Because of the problems the oil industry has 
incurred during the past year (oil prices at a 10 year 
low), many oil companies are undergoing serious economic 
difficulties and therefore may be poor credit risks. 
Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the extent of inherent risk that you feel exists with 
respect to the proper valuation of ABC Company's 
receivables. (Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
account balance or class of transactions to material error 
or misstatement, irrespective of the related system of 
internal control). 
0_1_2_3_4_5_6_7_8-9-10 
no inherent 
risk exists 
a moderate level 
of inherent risk 
exists 
a high level 
of inherent 
risk exists 
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Exhibit 3: Low Inherent Risk Manipulation for Pilot Test I 
Assume that you are auditing the sales and 
receivables cycle of ABC Company. Specifically, you are 
involved in examining the collectibility of your client's 
receivables. ABC Company is a manufacturer and 
distributor of medical equipment and supplies. The 
company had 80 million dollars in sales last year and has 
outstanding receivables of 15 million dollars. The 
accounts receivable balance consists of 600 accounts 
ranging from approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. 
Preliminary audit work indicates that the most of the 
company's sales are made on a credit basis to hospitals 
and large medical facilities in the U.S. Historically, 
such institutions have had a low risk of default and 
therefore have been considered good credit risks. 
Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the extent of inherent risk that you feel exists with 
respect to the proper valuation of ABC Company's 
receivables. (Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
account balance or class of transactions to material error 
or misstatement, irrespective of the related system of 
internal control). 
0....1....2....3....4....5_6.-7-8-.9-10 
. i ! 
no inherent 
risk exists 
a moderate level 
of inherent risk 
exists 
a high level 
of inherent 
risk exists 
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Exhibit 4: Strong Control Design Strength Manipulation 
for Pilot Test I 
The following is a desciption of the process your 
client, XYZ Company, uses to authorize credit sales. 
After reading the description, you will be asked to 
determine how strong this process is, in terms of its 
ability to prevent sales from being made to customers that 
are poor credit risks. 
The Credit Approval Process: 
XYZ Company's credit approval process is a component 
of the company's on-line sales processing system. Once a 
customer order is entered into the system, the credit 
approval process begins. 
If the order is from a new customer, the system 
automatically sends information concerning the customer 
and the sales order to XYZ's credit department. Upon 
receipt of this information, the credit department obtains 
a list of the customer's vendors and the name of the 
customer's primary banking institution. The department 
contacts two of the customer's vendors, the customer's 
bank, and the Dunn and Bradstreet credit information 
service for the purpose of obtaining standard credit 
information about the customer. Once all of the reguired 
credit information is available on the system, the 
customer's name and order number is added to a file of 
customers ready for review. The company credit manager 
then accesses and reviews the customer's credit 
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information. If the credit manager considers the customer 
to be a bad credit risk, a rejection code is entered into 
the system causing the order to be rejected and a notice 
to be sent to the customer. If the customer is considered 
a good risk, the credit manager determines an acceptable 
credit limit for the customer. If the amount of the order 
does not exceed this limit, a credit authorization number 
is entered into the system which triggers processing of 
the order. However, if the amount of the order exeeds 
this credit limit, the order is held in a suspense file 
and the customer is notified. 
If the order is from a repeat customer, the system 
performs several preliminary checks prior to initiating 
the detailed review. First, the system checks to see if 
an order from the customer has been rejected within the 
past year. If so, the customer's order is not processed 
and the customer is notified. If the customer has not had 
an order rejected within the past year, then the 
customer's credit record is checked for past due 
receivables. If the customer has receivables that are 60 
days or more past due, the order is not processed and the 
customer is notified. If however, the customer's last 
credit rating was acceptable and the customer has no past 
due receivables, then the information concerning the 
customer and the order is sent to the credit department. 
If the customer had a detailed credit review performed 
within the past 30 days then only a follow-up review is 
170 
performed. The follow-up review consists of obtaining 
information from Dunn and Bradstreet and the customer's 
bank and reassessing the credit limit. If a detailed 
credit review has not been performed within the past 30 
days, then the detailed credit check described above is 
performed. 
Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, how 
strong you feel this credit approval process is. 
0-1-2-3-4-5_6_7_8_9_10 
the process 
is very 
weak 
the process 
is very 
strong 
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Exhibit 5: Weak Control Design Strength Manipulation for 
Pilot Test I 
The following is a desciption of the process your 
client, XYZ Company, uses to authorize credit sales. 
After reading the description, you will be asked to 
determine how strong this process is, in terms of its 
ability to prevent sales from being made to customers that 
are poor credit risks. 
The Credit Approval Process: 
XYZ Company's credit approval process is a component 
of the company's on-line sales processing system. Once a 
customer order is entered into the system, the credit 
approval process automatically begins. 
If the order is from a new customer, the system 
checks the customer credit reference file to see if two 
credit references are available for the customer. The 
credit references are obtained from two of the customer's 
vendors. The reference form asks the vendor to provide 
standard credit information concerning the customer. The 
sales person responsible for acquiring the order is 
responsible for obtaining the credit references. All 
credit references are reviewed and initialed by one of the 
company's credit managers. Once initialed, the credit 
reference information is entered into the system. If the 
credit references are available for a new customer, then 
the order is automatically processed by the system. If 
the credit references are not available for a new 
customer, the order is automatically placed into a 
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suspense file and the sales person responsible for the 
order is notified. 
If the order is from a repeat customer, the system 
checks to see if the customer has any oustanding 
receivables with XYZ Company. This is done by accessing 
the customer's receivable record in XYZ's accounts 
receivable file. This record contains information 
concerning the amount and age of all outstanding 
receivables belonging to the customer. 
If the record shows that the customer has any 
receivables that are 90 days or more past due, the order 
is rejected, . Rejection of an order causes the system to 
place the customer's order into a suspense file and to 
generate a customer rejection notice for mailing. If the 
customer's record shows that there are no receivables that 
are 90 days or more past due, then the credit sale is 
automatically processed. 
Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, how 
strong you feel this credit approval process is. 
0-1. . . 
i • i • 
i • 
the process 
is very 
weak 
i 
the process 
is very 
strong 
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Exhibit 6: Internal Audit Variable Section of Pilot Test I 
The internal audit department of your client, Smith 
Corp., has recently audited Smith's credit authorization 
process, a component of the company's on-line sales 
processing system. Assume that you are presently auditing 
this client and may be able to incorporate some of this 
work into your audit examination. 
A. Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the level of objectivity you feel Smith's internal audit 
department possesses, given the following: 
1. The internal audit department reports to the company 
controller. In effect, the internal audit department is 
under the control of the company controller. 
0 
i 
a very low level 
of objectivity 
...4_5_6.. 
i 
i 
a moderate level 
of objectivity 
8 10 
i 
• 
f 
a very high level 
of objectivity 
2. The internal audit department reports to an independent 
audit committee. In effect, the internal audit department 
is under the control of the independent audit committee. 
0_1_2_3_4_5_6_7_8_9_10 
! ! ! 
i i I • • • 
a very low level a moderate level a very high level 
of objectivity of objectivity of objectivity 
3. The internal audit department was involved in and 
responsible for the design of the on-line sales processing 
system including the credit approval process. 
0 
i 
8 
a very low level 
of objectivity 
a moderate level 
of objectivity 
10 
i 
i 
a very high level 
of objectivity 
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4. The internal auditors were not involved in or 
responsible for the design of the sales processing system 
or the credit approval process. 
0 
i 
• 
i 
8 10 
i 
i 
a very low level 
of objectivity 
a moderate level 
of objectivity 
a very high level 
of objectivity 
B. Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the level of competence you feel Smith's internal audit 
department possesses, given the following: 
1. The internal audit department at Smith Co. consists 
mainly of former "Big Eight" auditors with at least 3 
years of audit experience. Most of the internal auditors 
have been with Smith Co. for at least 4 years. The 
department head has been with the company for 8 years. 
0-1-2-3-4-5-6_7_8_9_10 
I ! ! 
I ! ! 
a very low level a moderate level a very high level 
of competence of competence of competence 
2. The department consists mainly of individuals without 
college degrees and recent college graduates with degrees 
in accounting and no previous work experience. The head 
of the department has been at Smith Co. for 30 years and 
is nearing retirement. 
0-1_2.. 
i 
• 
i 
a very low level 
of competence 
...4_5_6.. 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a moderate level 
of competence 
7 . . .8_9_10 
! 
I 
a very high level 
of competence 
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C. Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the comprehensiveness of the following procedures 
performed by Smith's internal audit department. 
1. The internal auditors monitor the credit authorization 
process by periodically observing credit approval 
activities and making inguiries of credit department 
personnel. 
0-1_2_3. 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a very low 
level of 
comprehensiveness 
4-5_6_7. 
i 
i 
a moderate 
level of 
comprehensivness 
8-9-10 
i 
! 
• 
a very high 
level of 
comprehensiveness 
2. The internal auditors monitor the credit authorization 
process by performing detailed tests on the system. They 
perform detailed tests to determine whether the required 
credit information is being obtained for all customers and 
whether the decisions to grant credit to customers are 
being made consistent with company policy. 
0-1_2_3. 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a very low 
level of 
comprehensiveness 
4_5_6_7. 
i 
• 
i 
a moderate 
level of 
comprehensivness 
8_9_10 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a very high 
level of 
comprehensiveness 
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Exhibit 7: The Cover Letter for Pilot Test II. 
Dear Participant, 
I am currently performing research concerning the 
effect of certain audit engagement characteristics on 
auditors' sample size decisions. As a preliminary part of 
of this research, I need to acquire auditors' opinions 
concerning certain audit engagement characteristics. I 
would like you to carefully read the following information 
and respond to the question(s) that follow it. Thank you 
very much for your assistance and cooporation. 
Sincerely, 
Mario Maletta 
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Exhibit 8: High Inherent Risk Manipulation for Pilot 
Test II 
ABC Company is a manufacturer of equipment and 
supplies that are used by companies in the oil extraction 
and exploration industry. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. During those audits, no 
major problems were found with respect to the 
collectibility of accounts receivable. Similar to 
previous years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that most of the company's credit sales have 
been made to domestic oil companies. However, because of 
the problems the oil industry has incurred during the past 
year (oil prices at a 10 year low), many oil companies are 
undergoing serious economic difficulties and therefore may 
be poor credit risks. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has outstanding receivables of $17 million. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
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Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the extent of inherent risk that you feel exists with 
respect to the proper valuation of ABC Company's 
receivables. (Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
account balance or class of transactions to material error 
or misstatement, irrespective of the related system of 
internal control). 
0-1_2_3 
I 
j 
no inherent 
risk exists 
. .4-5_6_7 
i 
i 
• 
a moderate level 
of inherent risk 
exists 
8-9_10 
i 
i 
• 
a high level 
of inherent 
risk exists 
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Exhibit 9: Low Inherent Risk Manipulation for Pilot 
Test II 
ABC Company is a manufacturer and distributor of 
medical equipment and supplies. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. During those audits, no 
major problems were found with respect to the 
collectibility of accounts receivable. Similar to 
previous years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that the most of the company's sales have been 
made on a credit basis to hospitals and large medical 
facilities in the U.S. Historically, hospitals and large 
medical institutions have had a low risk of default and, 
therefore, are considered good credit risks. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has gross receivables of $17 million. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
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Please indicate (circle) , using the scale provided, 
the extent of inherent risk that you feel exists with 
respect to the proper valuation of ABC Company's 
receivables. (Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
account balance or class of transactions to material error 
or misstatement, irrespective of the related system of 
internal control). 
0-1_2_3 
i 
• 
i 
no inherent 
risk exists 
..4_5_6... 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a moderate level 
of inherent risk 
exists 
7_8_9_10 
i 
a high level 
of inherent 
risk exists 
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Exhibit 10: The Cover Letter for Pilot Test III. 
Dear Participant, 
I am currently performing research concerning the 
effect of certain audit engagement characteristics on 
auditors' sample size decisions. As a preliminary part of 
of this research, I need to acquire auditors' opinions 
concerning certain audit engagement characteristics. I 
would like you to carefully read the following information 
and respond to the question(s) that follow it. Thank you 
very much for your assistance and cooporation. 
Sincerely, 
Mario Maletta 
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Exhibit 11: High Inherent Risk Manipulation of Pilot 
Test III 
ABC Company is a manufacturer of equipment and 
supplies that are used by companies in the oil extraction 
and exploration industry. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. Similar to previous 
years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that most of the company's credit sales have 
been made to domestic oil companies. However, because of 
the problems the oil industry has incurred during the past 
year (oil prices at a 10 year low), many oil companies are 
undergoing serious economic difficulties and therefore may 
be poor credit risks. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has gross receivables of $17 million. The balance in the 
allowance for doubtful accounts is $810,000. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
This year the audit of ABC Co. must be completed within 5 
weeks after their fiscal year end. 
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Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the extent of inherent risk that you feel exists with 
respect to the proper valuation of ABC Company's 
receivables. (Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
account balance or class of transactions to material error 
or misstatement, irrespective of the related system of 
internal control). 
0-1_2 
I 
i 
no inherent 
risk exists 
3 . .4_5_6_7 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a moderate level 
of inherent risk 
exists 
8 
a 
. .9_10 
i 
• 
i 
high level 
of inherent 
risk exists 
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Exhibit 12: Low Inherent Risk Manipulation for Pilot 
Test III 
ABC Company is a manufacturer and distributor of 
medical equipment and supplies. Your firm has audited ABC 
Company for the past three years. During those audits, no 
major problems were found with respect to the 
collectibility of accounts receivable. Similar to 
previous years, preliminary audit work performed this year 
indicates that the most of the company's sales have been 
made on a credit basis to hospitals and large medical 
facilities in the U.S. Historically, hospitals and large 
medical institutions have had a low risk of default and, 
therefore, are considered good credit risks. In the past 
year, no major changes have occurred with respect to ABC's 
internal or external business environment. Co. 
The company had $80 million in sales this year and 
has gross receivables of $17 million. The balance in the 
allowance for doubtful accounts is $810,000. The accounts 
receivable balance consists of 600 accounts ranging from 
approximately $25,000 to $30,000 in amount. ABC's 
accounts receivables aging is as follows: 
0-30 days 38% 
31 - 60 days 31% 
61 - 90 days 21% 
over 90 days 10% 
ABC Company's sales terms (consistent with the 
industry) require that balances be paid within 60 days. 
This year the audit of ABC Co. must be completed within 5 
weeks after their fiscal year end. 
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Please indicate (circle), using the scale provided, 
the extent of inherent risk that you feel exists with 
respect to the proper valuation of ABC Company's 
receivables. (Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
account balance or class of transactions to material error 
or misstatement, irrespective of the related system of 
internal control). 
0-1_2 
t 
i 
no inherent 
risk exists 
3 . .4_5_6. . . 
i 
• 
i 
• 
a moderate level 
of inherent risk 
exists 
7 8 9 10 
i 
i 
a high level 
of inherent 
risk exists 
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